

1382. FORMAL INVESTIGATION IN AND BY THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT [1, AND 3.], BODY/ENTITY TO RECEIVE, TO CONSIDER AND TO COMPETENTLY DETERMINE MERIT AND QUALIFICATION OF SUCH COMPLAINT BY RESPECTIVE LIFER, WHICH IS A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION (CH. III [3.]), SUCH AS COURT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (AS WAS DONE RECENTLY [213.]), THEN, NOT ONLY DOES SAID LIFER OWN THE RIGHT OF COMPLAINT, THEY ALSO OWN AN ACCRUED RIGHT OF JUDICIAL
 1383. REMEDY, WHICH, IN THE COMPLAINT BY ME, AGAINST STATE GOVERNMENT REFUSING TO ENFORCE MY IMPOSED SENTENCE [74., 75., 77., 79., 78. AND 80.], WOULD RESULT IN COURT ORDERING STATE GOVERNMENT TO PROMPTLY PAROLE-
 1384. RELEASE ME ACCORDING TO 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS, WHICH INCLUDES
 1385. CALCULATION OF 'NPP DATE' [126.], ~~■~~ OF APPROXIMATELY 2009, AND A
 1386. "WHOLLY SATISFIED" ([SEE TEXT AT 1259, 1261, IBID]), SENTENCE SATISFACTION/COMPLETION OF APPROXIMATELY 2019 ("ALTHOUGH ORIGINALLY
 1387. ONE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT, WILL BE WHOLLY SATISFIED [78.]" [SEE TEXT AT 1259, IBID]), ~~■~~ AS DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT [SEE TEXT AT 938 TO 942, 941 TO 953, 975 AND 976, IBID]';

1388. THE COMPETENT PASSAGE OF PAROLE BOARD JURISDICTION (SUCH AS PER 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS [74., 78., 79. AND 80.]), AFTER 'PAROLE-RELEASE', ~~■~~ PLUS 'HOW LONG FOR' (DCS ACT S. 67(6)(A)(ii)), PLUS 'WHEN IT STARTS' (DCS ACT S. 67(6)(A)(i)), IS FORWARDED TO GOVERNOR [29.] (DCS ACT. 67(6)(B)), THEN 'GOVERNOR [29.], ANSWERS DCS ACT S. 67(6)(B) ([100.]), WITHIN THE OPERATION OF DCS ACT S. 67(7) ([101.]), WITH ONLY (AFTER 'LEGALITY REVIEW', AND CONSIDERATION OF [TEXT AT 1366 TO 1376 (INCLUSIVE) IBID.]), AN 'APPROVAL AND FINAL SIGN-OFF', RELEASE ON PAROLE MUST FOLLOW, AND, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE AN ACTION BY STATE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS OUTSIDE OF JURISDICTION 'OPEN' TO BOARD AND GOVERNOR ([29.]).

1389. EVERY OTHER FORMAL DETERMINATION BY BOARD AND/OR GOVERNOR ([29.]), AGAINST 'RELEASE ON PAROLE RULING', INCLUDING AGAINST COMPLIANCE WITH ACTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE AT [TEXT 1384, 1385, 1386, 1387, IBID]', WOULD EFFECTIVELY BE OUTSIDE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF BOARD AND/OR

1390. GOVERNOR [29.], AND CONSEQUENTIALLY CANNOT LAWFULLY EXIST. THE STRICT AND VERY NARROW SCOPE OF JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 'OPEN' TO BOARD, GOVERNOR ([29.]), AND SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, TOWARDS A LIFER SUCH AS ME, DUE TO AND CONSEQUENTIAL TO THE COMPETENT AND PROPER SENTENCING STANDARDS, AS PROPERLY IMPOSED UPON ME IN 2002 [74.], VERY CLEARLY ANCHOR JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY TO SPECIFIC PARTIES, FOR SPECIFIC REASON, AND, I ACCUSE THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1.], ACTIONING EFFECTS NOT OPEN TO THEM, AND, CRIMINALLY DISREGARDING THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] OBLIGATION TO LAWFULLY ENFORCE MY 2002 IMPOSED SENTENCE [74., 64., 65., 82., 83., 199., 200. AND 201.].

OR;

1391. PATH. B., WHICH IS THE 'OTHER' PASSAGE OF DUE PROCESS 'OPEN' TO THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, IF THE STATE GOVERNMENT, AT THE 'FRONT DOOR' OF DCS ACT s. 67(6) ([100.]), DOES NOT WANT TO PAROLE-RELEASE RESPECTIVE LIFER-APPLICANT (SEEKING PAROLE-RELEASE [94.]), THEREFORE, AND IT IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS DECISION (PATH. A., OR, PATH. B.), MUST BE MADE PRIOR TO PROCESSING OF [94.] (ONCE ENTERING THE OPERATION OF DCS ACT. s. 67(6)), REACHING "THE BOARD - (A) MUST" [100.], BECAUSE 1392. ONCE DCS ACT s. 67(6)(A) ([100.]), IS REACHED, THERE IS NO 'GOING BACK' 1393. TO START OF DCS ACT s. 67(6) [NOT ONLY IS THERE NO STATUTORY WORDING TO PERMIT 'GOING BACK', NOR IS ANY SUCH ACTION ('GOING BACK'), EVEN IMPLIED, 1394. ONCE DCS ACT s. 67(6)(A) [100.], HAS BEEN ACTIVATED, 'FIRSTLY', IT IS BECAUSE STATE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO EFFECT PAROLE-RELEASE (PATH. A.), 1395. THEREBY PROGRESSING TO DCS ACT s. 67(6)(A), 'SECONDLY, ONCE EITHER OF THE TWO SPECIFIED 'PATHS' (PATH. A., OR, PATH. B.), HAS BEEN ACTIVATED, VERY SPECIFIC STATUTORY DUE PROCESS COMPLIANCE MUST FOLLOW (AND 'GOING BACK' 1396. IS NOT A PERMITTED PROCESS)', 'THIRDLY, ONLY ONE PATH (EITHER PATH. A., OR PATH. B.), CAN OPERATE AT A TIME DUE TO THE PROCEDURAL LAW NATURE OF 1397. BOTH PATHS, SO THAT IF PATH. A. IS ACTIVATED, PATH. B. IS 'CLOSED'

1398. FROM BEING CONSIDERED ANY FURTHER (IN OTHER WORDS PATH, B. IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE/VIABLE (OTHERWISE 'ABUSE OF PROCESS' WOULD OCCUR)), HOWEVER, IF PATH, B. IS ACTIVATED, PATH, A. IS 'CLOSED PENDING CHANGE' (WHAT THIS MEANS IS THAT TWO POSSIBILITIES EXIST WHILE PATH, B. IS 'BE PROCESSED', ONE AVAILABLE OPTION IS TO CONTINUE PATH, B. TO ITS FURTHER OUTCOME (WHICH IS THE JUDGMENT OF THE COMPETENT COURT, CONSEQUENTIAL TO FORMAL APPLICATION PER [38.1]), THE SECOND AVAILABLE OPTION IS TO DISCONTINUE/ HALT 'DUE PROCESSING OF PATH, B. OUTHRIGHT' (WHICH THEN MANDATES ACTIVATION OF PATH, A., AT THE OPERATIONAL ORDERS OF DCS ACT S. 67(6)(A) [100.1], [SEE TEXT AT 1393, 1394, IBID 1]), SO, IF PATH, B. IS ACTIONED, THEN THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT MUST PROMPTLY INITIATE STATUTORY COMPLIANCE WITH PROCESSES DESCRIBED FOR 'EXTENDING 'NFP DATE' AND 'NFP OF TIME', TO THE COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION ([38, 40, 44, 45, AND 194. (PARAS. 28, 43, 68.1)], AND, IT MUST BE DONE ACCORDING TO CONSTITUTIONAL (E1, AND 3.1), CONVENTIONS, SO THAT ALTHOUGH SUCH 'FORMAL APPLICATION' IS INITIATED, IN CH. II [3.1], PER. COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY HELD BY S.A. GOVERNMENT, CH. III [3.1], COMPETENT COURTS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ARE THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.1], AUTHORISED ENVIRONMENTS WITHIN WHICH SAID 'FORMAL APPLICATION' (SUBMITTED BY AUTHORISED PARTY ON BEHALF OF S.A. GOVERNMENT [45, 38, 40, 44, AND 194. (PARA. 11.1)], ARE PERMITTED TO BE PROPERLY ARGUED AND DETERMINED ([210. (PARA. 68.1)], AND, FOR THIS, FUNDAMENTAL REASON, CH. II [3.1] S.A. GOVERNMENT ACTION WHICH CREATES A 'FAKE NFP DATE', AND, 'FAKE NFP OF TIME', AGAINST A LIFER SUCH AS ME (AND THE CHANGE OF MEANING OF THE WORDS OF MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.1], BY STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AS I HAVE DESCRIBED IN THIS DOCUMENT [SEE TEXT AT 938, 939, 940, 941, IBID 1]), AND, AGAINST LIFERS SUCH AS ANDREWS ([207.1] PARA. 17 OF JUDGMENT PROPER "IT IS ALSO AGREED THAT HE COMPLETED SERVING THAT RECALCULATED PERIOD ON 13 FEBRUARY 2006.", AND WATSON ([194.1] PARA. 1. OF JUDGMENT PROPER "MR WATSON IS SERVING A SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE, HIS NON-PAROLE PERIOD EXPIRED ON 24 JANUARY 2002.
1399. SO, IF PATH, B. IS ACTIONED, THEN THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT MUST PROMPTLY INITIATE STATUTORY COMPLIANCE WITH PROCESSES DESCRIBED FOR 'EXTENDING 'NFP DATE' AND 'NFP OF TIME', TO THE COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION ([38, 40, 44, 45, AND 194. (PARAS. 28, 43, 68.1)], AND, IT MUST BE DONE ACCORDING TO CONSTITUTIONAL (E1, AND 3.1), CONVENTIONS, SO THAT ALTHOUGH SUCH 'FORMAL APPLICATION' IS INITIATED, IN CH. II [3.1], PER. COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY HELD BY S.A. GOVERNMENT, CH. III [3.1], COMPETENT COURTS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ARE THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.1], AUTHORISED ENVIRONMENTS WITHIN WHICH SAID 'FORMAL APPLICATION' (SUBMITTED BY AUTHORISED PARTY ON BEHALF OF S.A. GOVERNMENT [45, 38, 40, 44, AND 194. (PARA. 11.1)], ARE PERMITTED TO BE PROPERLY ARGUED AND DETERMINED ([210. (PARA. 68.1)], AND, FOR THIS, FUNDAMENTAL REASON, CH. II [3.1] S.A. GOVERNMENT ACTION WHICH CREATES A 'FAKE NFP DATE', AND, 'FAKE NFP OF TIME', AGAINST A LIFER SUCH AS ME (AND THE CHANGE OF MEANING OF THE WORDS OF MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.1], BY STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AS I HAVE DESCRIBED IN THIS DOCUMENT [SEE TEXT AT 938, 939, 940, 941, IBID 1]), AND, AGAINST LIFERS SUCH AS ANDREWS ([207.1] PARA. 17 OF JUDGMENT PROPER "IT IS ALSO AGREED THAT HE COMPLETED SERVING THAT RECALCULATED PERIOD ON 13 FEBRUARY 2006.", AND WATSON ([194.1] PARA. 1. OF JUDGMENT PROPER "MR WATSON IS SERVING A SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE, HIS NON-PAROLE PERIOD EXPIRED ON 24 JANUARY 2002.
1400. ALTHOUGH SUCH 'FORMAL APPLICATION' IS INITIATED, IN CH. II [3.1], PER. COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY HELD BY S.A. GOVERNMENT, CH. III [3.1], COMPETENT COURTS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ARE THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.1], AUTHORISED ENVIRONMENTS WITHIN WHICH SAID 'FORMAL APPLICATION' (SUBMITTED BY AUTHORISED PARTY ON BEHALF OF S.A. GOVERNMENT [45, 38, 40, 44, AND 194. (PARA. 11.1)], ARE PERMITTED TO BE PROPERLY ARGUED AND DETERMINED ([210. (PARA. 68.1)], AND, FOR THIS, FUNDAMENTAL REASON, CH. II [3.1] S.A. GOVERNMENT ACTION WHICH CREATES A 'FAKE NFP DATE', AND, 'FAKE NFP OF TIME', AGAINST A LIFER SUCH AS ME (AND THE CHANGE OF MEANING OF THE WORDS OF MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.1], BY STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AS I HAVE DESCRIBED IN THIS DOCUMENT [SEE TEXT AT 938, 939, 940, 941, IBID 1]), AND, AGAINST LIFERS SUCH AS ANDREWS ([207.1] PARA. 17 OF JUDGMENT PROPER "IT IS ALSO AGREED THAT HE COMPLETED SERVING THAT RECALCULATED PERIOD ON 13 FEBRUARY 2006.", AND WATSON ([194.1] PARA. 1. OF JUDGMENT PROPER "MR WATSON IS SERVING A SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE, HIS NON-PAROLE PERIOD EXPIRED ON 24 JANUARY 2002.
1401. COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY HELD BY S.A. GOVERNMENT, CH. III [3.1], COMPETENT COURTS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ARE THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.1], AUTHORISED ENVIRONMENTS WITHIN WHICH SAID 'FORMAL APPLICATION' (SUBMITTED BY AUTHORISED PARTY ON BEHALF OF S.A. GOVERNMENT [45, 38, 40, 44, AND 194. (PARA. 11.1)], ARE PERMITTED TO BE PROPERLY ARGUED AND DETERMINED ([210. (PARA. 68.1)], AND, FOR THIS, FUNDAMENTAL REASON, CH. II [3.1] S.A. GOVERNMENT ACTION WHICH CREATES A 'FAKE NFP DATE', AND, 'FAKE NFP OF TIME', AGAINST A LIFER SUCH AS ME (AND THE CHANGE OF MEANING OF THE WORDS OF MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.1], BY STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AS I HAVE DESCRIBED IN THIS DOCUMENT [SEE TEXT AT 938, 939, 940, 941, IBID 1]), AND, AGAINST LIFERS SUCH AS ANDREWS ([207.1] PARA. 17 OF JUDGMENT PROPER "IT IS ALSO AGREED THAT HE COMPLETED SERVING THAT RECALCULATED PERIOD ON 13 FEBRUARY 2006.", AND WATSON ([194.1] PARA. 1. OF JUDGMENT PROPER "MR WATSON IS SERVING A SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE, HIS NON-PAROLE PERIOD EXPIRED ON 24 JANUARY 2002.
1402. (PARA. 11.1)], ARE PERMITTED TO BE PROPERLY ARGUED AND DETERMINED ([210. (PARA. 68.1)], AND, FOR THIS, FUNDAMENTAL REASON, CH. II [3.1] S.A. GOVERNMENT ACTION WHICH CREATES A 'FAKE NFP DATE', AND, 'FAKE NFP OF TIME', AGAINST A LIFER SUCH AS ME (AND THE CHANGE OF MEANING OF THE WORDS OF MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.1], BY STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AS I HAVE DESCRIBED IN THIS DOCUMENT [SEE TEXT AT 938, 939, 940, 941, IBID 1]), AND, AGAINST LIFERS SUCH AS ANDREWS ([207.1] PARA. 17 OF JUDGMENT PROPER "IT IS ALSO AGREED THAT HE COMPLETED SERVING THAT RECALCULATED PERIOD ON 13 FEBRUARY 2006.", AND WATSON ([194.1] PARA. 1. OF JUDGMENT PROPER "MR WATSON IS SERVING A SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE, HIS NON-PAROLE PERIOD EXPIRED ON 24 JANUARY 2002.
1403. ANDREWS ([207.1] PARA. 17 OF JUDGMENT PROPER "IT IS ALSO AGREED THAT HE COMPLETED SERVING THAT RECALCULATED PERIOD ON 13 FEBRUARY 2006.", AND WATSON ([194.1] PARA. 1. OF JUDGMENT PROPER "MR WATSON IS SERVING A SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE, HIS NON-PAROLE PERIOD EXPIRED ON 24 JANUARY 2002.
1404. WATSON ([194.1] PARA. 1. OF JUDGMENT PROPER "MR WATSON IS SERVING A SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE, HIS NON-PAROLE PERIOD EXPIRED ON 24 JANUARY 2002.

SINCE THEN THE PAROLE BOARD OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA ("THE BOARD") ON FIVE OCCASIONS HAS RECOMMENDED TO THE GOVERNOR PURSUANT TO S. 67(6) OF THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT 1982 (SA) (THE CSA) THAT MR WATSON BE RELEASED ON PAROLE.

ON EACH OCCASION THE GOVERNOR HAS REFUSED TO ORDER THAT MR WATSON BE RELEASED."),
 1405. IS A RADICAL VIOLATION/BREACH OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE [1.],

FOR REASONS DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT IN MORE DETAIL (SENTENCING AND AMENDING COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE, UPON A LIFER IN S.A., CAN LAWFULLY ONLY BE DONE BY AN APPEAL COURT (RE-SENTENCING [38.]), INCLUDING HCA (FEDERAL), OTHER THAN ORIGINAL SENTENCING COURT (SUPREME COURT, CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION [84.

1406. AND 45.]), AND, MUST BE INVALIDATED UPON COMPETENT AND HONEST ASSESSMENT OF SAID RADICAL BREACH OF PROCEDURAL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, SUBSTANTIVE LAW ([65., 82., 83., 113., 196., 197., 198., 200., 201., 208. AND 213.]), WHEN FUNDAMENTALLY DETERMINING, AUTHORITATIVELY, 'IF WHAT WAS DONE (BY STATE GOVERNMENT, AS COMPLAINED OF HEREIN BY ME), WAS DONE WITHOUT LAW, THEN IT WAS DONE UNLAWFULLY', AND, 'IF WHAT WAS DONE, WAS DONE AGAINST LAW, THEN IT WAS DONE ILLEGALLY', AND, BOTH EQUATE OPERATIONALLY TO UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDUCT ([1.]), WHEN PARTICULARISING WHAT IT WAS WHICH WAS STOLEN FROM ME, AND ANDREWS [207.], AND WATSON [194.], BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA ([3.] CH. II.), INCLUDING RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL PROPRIETY, RIGHT TO CUSTODIAL PROPRIETY, RIGHT TO ENFORCEMENT OF COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE (BY STATE/CH. II [3.]), ~~AND~~ THEREFORE,

1407. IF PATH. B. IS ACTIONED [SEE TEXT AT 1399. IBID.], THEN, THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA MUST COMPLY WITH PROCEDURAL LAWS, WITHOUT DELAY, THAT ARE STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS UPON STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II, CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO ENFORCE ALL LAWS, STATUTES, RELATING TO ENFORCING SENTENCE IMPOSED BY SENTENCING COURT, AND, OBSERVING, ENFORCING AND APPLYING ALL DUE PROCESSES (PROCEDURAL LAW), 'OPEN' TO RESPECTIVE LIFER ([3. AND 45.]), AND MAKE
 1408. FORMAL APPLICATION TO THE (COMPETENT), COURT, FOR 'JUDICIAL INCREASE TO EXISTING NON-PAROLE PERIOD', PER CLSA s. 32(6) [40.], THEREBY,

1409. OPERATIONALLY EFFECTING INTO MOTION A RE-SENTENCING HEARING, WITH

strict due processes which also must be complied with, not only by South Australian Government (who is submitting said Application [40.1]), but also by Courts Administration Authority (as the Procedural Laws (Rules of Court)) relevant to such Application (by State Government), must be observed and applied in the proper way, as the rule of law so obligates;

When comparing, what must be done by State Government, if Path. B. is actioned, to, what State Government actually did (to a lifer such as me (2002 sentenced to 1992 standards [74.1], but rather than properly enforce sentence per 1992 standards, instead imposed State Government's own created 'fake sentence' against me (yet held no Ch. II [3.1], Constitutional competence to do so (effecting jurisdictional fraud [82.1, and 83.1, [213.1]), [see text at 938, 939, 940, 941, 'ibid']), to lifers such as Andrews [207.1, and Watson [194.1] (sentencing standards court imposed, to those existing prior to [46.1] (which started 1-8-1994), being the automatic Parole Act" (Andrews [207.1, (para. 15 of Judgment Proper)), but rather than properly enforce respective sentences per actual court imposed sentences (and anchoring to same were the full effect of the intrinsic 'accrued rights' / substantive rights, described in part in Andrews [207.1] Judgment Proper, paragraph 20, and therein subsections 66(1) [126.1, and 66(3) [128.1], present undeniable qualification of the accrued rights of release, it is also worth noting from both subsections, at s. 66(1) [126.1], being a day not later than thirty days after... the non-parole period, the prisoner shall be released on parole within that 30 day window, so that the start date of parole is within said strict 30 days, and within [46.1], was converted to DCs Act s. 67(6) (A)(1) [100.1], and, at s. 66(3) [128.1], "who is serving a sentence of life imprisonment is to be released on parole...".

The prisoner must be parole-released, by use of the word "is" (hence the wording at s. 66(3) "where a prisoner... is to be released..."), and then at s. 66(3)(A) [128.1], "shall [30.1] applies, to which the duration of said parole term is the issue (between three and ten years), so in fact there are

1414.
1413.
1412.
1411.
1410.

1415.

TWO DISTINCT QUALIFICATIONS WITHIN THAT WORDING, SEEN AT "IS TO BE RELEASED" [128.], WHICH WITHIN [46.] WAS CONVERTED TO DCS ACT S. 67(6) "AND, IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS" [100.], AND THE OTHER IS SEEN AT S. 66 (3)(A) "[FULL TEXT]" [128.], WHICH WITHIN [46.] WAS CONVERTED TO DCS ACT S. 67(6)(A)(ii) [100.]", THAT, THE "PAROLE BOARD ONLY HOLDS JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE DUE PROCESSING TO PAROLE-RELEASE (PATH. A.), AND DOES NOT HOLD 'OPEN' TO IT ANY COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY TO REJECT, REFUSE OR DENY PAROLE-RELEASE (ITSELF, OR ANYWHERE, FROM ANYONE WITHIN DCS ACT PROPER, OR ANYWHERE WITHIN CH. II [3.]), TO ANY COMPETENT AND PERMISSIBLE PAROLE APPLICATION BY RESPECTIVE LIFER APPLICANT" (AS I HAVE DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT), ADDITIONALLY,

1416.

ANDREWS [207.], AND WATSON [194.], AND I [74.], PER OUR IMPOSED SENTENCES BY RESPECTIVE COMPETENT SENTENCING COURTS, ARE OWED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), THE UNBREAKABLE CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] RIGHT OF ENFORCEMENT (BY CH. II [3.]), OF OUR COURT IMPOSED SENTENCES, PURSUANT TO ALL RELATED SUBSTANTIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAWS, WHICH ALSO EMPLOYS CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] PROTECTION AGAINST THE CREATION/IMPOSING/ENFORCING OF ANY GREATER PENALTY OF SENTENCE, AGAINST US, BY ANY CHAPTER II [3.] (STATE GOVERNMENT), ENTITY/PERSON, OTHER THAN WHAT WAS 'DELIVERED BY' AND 'IMPOSED BY' OUR RESPECTIVE SENTENCING COURTS, DUE TO THE SPECIFIC SENTENCING STANDARDS IMPOSED UPON US [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847. IBID], SO,

1417.

BETWEEN IMPOSED SENTENCES UPON ANDREWS [207.], WATSON [194.], AND ME [74.], AND UP TO YEAR 2017 (WHICH LEGISLATIVELY NOW ALSO INCLUDES THE PARC [144., 145., 146., 147., 149., 150., 171. AND 172.]), NOT ONLY HAS CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT (S.A.) [85.], OR PAROLE BOARD (FROM WITHIN SAID ACT), OR SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), OR THE PARC (FROM WITHIN SAID ACT [171. AND 172.]), NOT HELD ANY 'COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY' TO 'REJECT/REFUSE/DENY' ANY

1418.

VALID PAROLE-RELEASE SUBMISSION/APPLICATION FROM US, NOR, 'CREATE, THEN APPLY, THEN ENFORCE ANY NEW 'NPP DATE AND NPP OF TIME' (WHICH IS NOT CREATED AND IMPOSED EITHER BY ANY STATE COURT (IN CH. III [3.]), OR HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA), AGAINST/UPON US, 'THE STATE GOVERNMENT DID EFFECT ILLEGAL ACTS AGAINST US (AS DETAILED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT), CLAIMING IT AND ITS AGENTS (OF CORRUPTION [199, 200. AND 201.]), HAD LAWFULLY EXERCISED JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY TO SO ACT, HOWEVER, IRONICALLY, AT NO TIME HAS THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (SINCE 1-8-1994 [46.]), EVER PRESENTED IN COURT, OR IN MY CASE, TO ME PERSONALLY, ANY 'CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.], VALID DOCUMENT' TO SUPPORT THEIR UNCONSTITUTIONAL/ILLEGAL/CRIMINAL ACTIONS AGAINST US'], WHICH HAVE BEEN STOLEN FROM ANDREWS [207.],

1419

WATSON [194.], ME [74.]) [AND A LOT MORE OTHER LIFERS TOO (INCLUDING LIFERS CONVICTED (AFTER 1-8-1994 [46.]), ~~OF~~ OF CRIMES HAPPENING AFTER 1-8-1994 [46.], WHO ARE REFUSED PAROLE-RELEASE (PCS ACT S. 67(9)(C)), BY PAROLE BOARD AND/OR GOVERNOR [29.], AND/OR PARC [171. AND 172.], THEN HAVE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]), CREATED, IMPOSED AND ENFORCED NEW CH. II ([3.]) 'NPP DATE' AND 'NPP OF TIME' (FAKE-SENTENCES WHICH ARE 'ENFORCED' BY STATE GOVERNMENT AS IF WERE VALID COURT-IMPOSED-SENTENCES), CARRIED OUT AGAINST THOSE PARTICULAR ^{LIFERS, INSTEAD} ~~OF~~ OF PATH. B. ENFORCEMENT)], INSTEAD IMPOSED STATE GOVERNMENT'S OWN CREATED 'FAKE SENTENCES' AGAINST SUCH LIFERS (YET HELD NO CH. II [3.], CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE TO DO SO (EFFECTING JURISDICTIONAL FRAUD [82. AND 83.], [199., 200. AND 201.], VALIDATION FOR JURISDICTIONAL ERROR AS JUDICIALLY DETERMINED SEE [213.]))], WHEREBY, [RETURN TO 1412.]

1420.

1421.

OUR COURT IMPOSED SENTENCES, PER COMPETENTLY APPLIED RESPECTIVE APPLICABLE SENTENCING STANDARDS, WERE, AND STILL ARE, PROTECTED BY RULE OF LAW APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTION ([1.]), GUARD

1422.

AGAINST 'THEFT OF' (OUR JUDICIALLY IMPOSED SUBSTANTIVE (ACCRUED), RIGHTS),

1423.

'ABUSE OF' (COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY, FALSELY USED TO THE EXTENT OF BEING CRIMINAL ABUSE OF AUTHORITY (ACTING AGAINST LEGITIMATE AND

CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.], VALID/PERMISSIBLE STATUTE AND COMMON LAW AUTHORITY), WHICH CONSEQUENTIALLY CAUSES ILLEGALLY CREATED HARM, TO US), AND

1424.

'VIOLATION OF' (ACTING OUTSIDE CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] COMPETENT AND

1425.

COMPLIANT DUE PROCESSES/PROCEDURES), THE FUNDAMENTAL AND FOUNDATION

RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO LAW (WITH USE OF THE COMMON FORM "LAW", HAVING THE INTRINSIC JURISDICTION OF ALL FORMS OF LAW RELEVANT TO THE RESPECTIVE PURPOSE, WITHOUT LIMITATION OR

1426.

RESTRICTION PROVIDING ITS USE IS CONSISTENT WITH RULES GOVERNING

COMPETENT DUE PROCESS), WHICH THE STATE GOVERNMENT, VIA SPECIFIC

CONDUCT PERFORMED, HAS NOT ONLY FAILED/NEGLECTED/REFUSED TO ENSURE PROPER OBSERVATION OF, IT HAS ALSO ~~BEEN~~ OVERSEEN STATUTORY AMENDMENTS

WHICH 'PURPORT' A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF LEGITIMATE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE,

FOR PAROLE BOARD, GOVERNOR [29.], AND STATE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH

AUSTRALIA TO OPERATIONALLY ACT TO MAKE DECISIONS (SPECIFICALLY RELATING

TO RESPECTIVE INDIVIDUAL LIFERS), BUT IN FACT DO SO WITHOUT THE

JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE WHICH THEY CLAIM TO HOLD (AS I HAVE

1427.

DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT), AND CONSEQUENTIALLY,

CREATES A REAL AND MEASURED EFFECTED OUTCOME, AGAINST SPECIFIC

(INDIVIDUAL LIFERS, INCLUDING ME [74.], ANDREWS [207.], WATSON [194.],

AND MANY OTHERS), SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LIFERS, WHICH ILLEGALLY RESULTS IN

SUCH LIFERS BEING POLITICAL PRISONERS (IF A GOVERNMENT PERSON

OR ENTITY MAKES A DECISION ULTRA VIRES THEN 'IT' IS ILLEGALLY DONE, EVEN

WHEN MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT VOTE ON A BILL (WHEN ASSENTED IT MUST BE

APPLIED BY STATE GOVERNMENT AS OPERATIONAL AMENDMENT), THEY EFFECTIVELY

DO SO AS GOVERNMENT ACCESSORIES BY VIRTUE OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL

'YES' VOTES (ENABLING Bill TO PASS))', [RETURN TO 1410.]

1428.

IT IS PLAINLY OBVIOUS TO AN HONEST PERSON, THAT 'WHAT MUST BE DONE'

WAS IN FACT NOT DONE AT ALL (THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT BY STATE GOVERNMENT TO

EMPLOY COMPETENT STATUTORY ACTION [38. AND 40.], AFTER RESPECTIVE

PAROLE APPLICATION SUBMITTED BY LIFER APPLICANTS, SUCH AS ANDREWS [207.],

1429. AND WATSON [194.], EVEN THOUGH MY 2002 FULL COURT JUDGMENT [74.], WAS ON COURT RECORD, AND STOOD AS AUTHORITY [77., 78., 79. AND 80.], FOR WHAT MUST BE DONE AS A MATTER OF COMPETENT LAW, WITH REGARD

1430. TO PROPER CALCULATION OF 'NPP DATE' OF LIFER, COMPETENTLY SENTENCED TO SENTENCING STANDARDS EXISTING IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO [46.](1-8-1994), BEING OPERATIONALLY APPLIED AND ENFORCED AFTER 1-8-1994, ACCORDING TO

1431. COMPETENT CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY (L1 AND 3.1), NOT HOWEVER, WAS DONE (AFTER 1-8-1994), BY GOVERNMENT OF CLAIMED AUTHORITY, SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.1], WHEN IN FACT THEY ACTED WITH FRAUDULENT 'CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY', IN OTHER WORDS,

1432. ACTED WITH NO CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] PERMISSION/AUTHORITY AT ALL, WHEN THEY 'PROCESSED' RESPECTIVE LIFER-APPLICANT'S PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH POST 1-8-1994 ([46.1]), STATUTE PROVISIONS,

1433. SOME OF THOSE STATUTE AMENDMENTS IN FACT BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL [1.] IN THEIR OPERATION/APPLICATION, AS DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT), WHICH WERE IN FACT ALSO 'MORE PENALISING' (IN DATE OF RELEASE, NPP DATE, NPP OF TIME, RELEASE AT ALL, ETC. ([46.1])), THAN THEIR INDIVIDUAL COURT IMPOSED SENTENCES, RATHER THAN ONLY BEING 'PROCESSED' IN

1434. ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMPETENT ORDERS OF THEIR COMPETENT SENTENCING COURTS, PER THEIR RESPECTIVE AND ACTUAL COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE, THEREFORE,

1435. WHERE THE COURTS IMPOSED SENTENCE, UPON ME [74.], ANDREWS [207.], WATSON [194.], (AND OTHER LIFERS WHERE THEIR COMPETENT COURTS IMPOSED SENTENCE, NPP DATE, WERE PROPERLY IMPOSED CONSISTENT WITH PRE [46.1], SENTENCING STANDARDS), COMPRISED A MATRIX OF COMMON LAW AND STATE LAW, WHICH EMBODIED WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD BY THE COURTS AS THE 'RELEVANT SENTENCING STANDARDS', SAID MATRIX INTRINSICALLY INCLUDED SUBSTANTIVE LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PROCEDURAL LAW AND COMMON LAW, WITH CONTROLLING GOVERNANCE OVER HOW, WHEN AND WHY, TO OBSERVE, APPLY AND ENFORCE PARTICULAR ELEMENTS OF SAID

1436.

MATRIX, BEING HELD UNDER 'THE HAT OF DUE PROCESS' (BASICALLY, IN ORDER TO 'FLOW A PROCESS', IT MUST 'FOLLOW A PREREQUISITE CONDITION OF

1437.

PASSAGE, AN ESTABLISHED, RECOGNISED PATH', SUCH AS STEP 1, THEN STEP 2, THEN STEP 3, THEN STEP 4, AND SO ON, AND, THAT PATH IS 'DUE PROCESS', BUT, IF A 'PARTY' VIOLATES (SKIPS OR DENIES TO THE 'OTHER PARTY',

1438.

SUCH AS WHEN THE CROWN PROSECUTOR, ATTORNEY-GENERAL, CABINET, GOVERNOR [29.], PAROLE BOARD, PARC (ALL BEING PERSONS/PARTIES WHO ACT ON BEHALF OF, THEREBY, REPRESENTING, THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA), DON'T ENGAGE [38. AND 40.], AGAINST A LIFER PAROLE-APPLICANT WHOM THE PAROLE BOARD OR GOVERNOR [29.] OR PARC [172.], DECIDE/DETERMINE THAT 'THEY' DON'T WISH/INTEND TO GRANT PAROLE-RELEASE TO, THEN, 'THEY' APPLY DCS ACT S. 67(9) ([107. AND 108.]), TO RATHER THAN ENGAGE [38.], [40.], [44.], [45.], AND [35.]. ("3. (1) "COURT" - (B) IN RELATION TO THE EXERCISE OF POWERS UNDER THIS ACT WITH RESPECT TO THE

1439.

VARIATION, REVOCATION OR ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER OF COURT OR OTHER RELATED MATTERS, MEANS THE COURT THAT MADE THE ORDER OR A COURT OF CO-ORDINATE JURISDICTION; "SENTENCE" MEANS - (A) THE IMPOSITION OF A PENALTY; (C) THE FIXING OR EXTENDING OF A NON-PAROLE PERIOD; (D) THE MAKING OF ANY OTHER ORDER OR DIRECTION AFFECTING PENALTY. "], 'WHICH IS A SITUATION WHEREBY THE ONLY

1440.

CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT ([1.]), 'PREREQUISITE CONDITION OF PASSAGE' OF SUCH PAROLE-APPLICANTS EXISTING AND NOT YET FINALISED PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER, IS TO BE DIRECTED TO STATE'S APPLICATION TO THE COURT ([38. AND 40.]), BUT INSTEAD STATE DOES NOT COMPLY WITH SUCH STATUTORY ([1.]) OBLIGATION UPON THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ENTITY OF GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (CH. II [3.]), THE 'GAINED OUTCOME' (CRIMINALLY ORCHESTRATED BY PROFESSIONALLY NEGLIGENT AND PROFESSIONALLY INCOMPETENT GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847. IBID.]), WHICH STATE GOVERNMENT THEN ENFORCES UPON ITSELF, BEING THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF DCS ACT S. 67(9) (C) [108.], A NEW AND 'FAKE-SENTENCE' WHICH 'IT' UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] CREATED IN

CHAPTER II [3.], AGAINST A LIFER (EVEN THOUGH A SENTENCE/PENALTY INCREASE OF SENTENCE AGAINST LIFER CAN ONLY LAWFULLY BE ACTIONED IN CH. III [3.], BY

COMPETENT COURT), IS AN 'OUTCOME GAINED' ONLY BY ACTING AGAINST THE 'RECOGNISED PATH OF DUE PROCESS', AND IS THEREFORE

A VIOLATION OF THE ORDER OF CONDUCT WHICH MUST BE PERFORMED, SO AS TO ENSURE ANY 'GAINED OUTCOME' IS NOT UNLAWFULLY CONSTRUCTED),

THE 'COMPRISED MATRIX OF RELEVANT LAW', THEN, THE 'PARTY' SO ACTING

HAS DONE SO UNLAWFULLY (WHERE THE 'PARENT LAW' IS THE CONSTITUTION [1.]), AND WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF THE CONSTITUTION [1.], TO SUPPORT OR

SUSTAIN SUCH CONDUCT, WHATEVER THE 'GAINED OUTCOME' IS (WHICH THE VIOLATING 'PARTY' ACQUIRED/ACHIEVED ONLY BY 'PERFORMED PROHIBITED ACT'),

AND AS HIGHLIGHTED ABOVE, THE 'GAINED OUTCOME' WHICH GOVERNMENT OF

SOUTH AUSTRALIA 'ACQUIRED/ACHIEVED' AND DID SO OUTSIDE THE 'RECOGNISED PATH OF DUE (COMPETENT), PROCESS', RELATING TO ANDREWS [207.] AND WATSON

[194.], STEMS FROM PAROLE BOARD, GOVERNOR [29.], DCS ACT [85.],

IMPROPERLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] BEING USED TO CREATE A FAKE NEW 'NPP DATE AND NPP OF TIME' AGAINST ANDREWS AND WATSON, DENYING PAROLE-

RELEASE OUTRIGHT, REFUSING/NEGLECTING TO ONLY ENFORCE THEIR RESPECTIVE

COURT IMPOSED PENALTIES OF SENTENCE (SUBSTITUTING WITH STATES OWN

CREATED ADDITIONAL SENTENCE PENALTY), EFFECTIVELY AND OPERATIONALLY

TREATING ANDREWS AND WATSON AS 'LIFERS SENTENCED TO GOVERNORS'

PLEASURE [204. (PARA. 83)]', EVEN THOUGH NOT SENTENCED BY THE

COURT IN THAT MANNER [126.], ALL DUE TO ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, AND

NONE ~~OF~~ OF THOSE INDIVIDUAL OUTCOMES WOULD EXIST IF CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.],

COMPETENT RECOGNISED PATH OF DUE PROCESS HAD BEEN OBSERVED AND

APPLIED AND ENFORCED BY S.A. GOVERNMENT, AS IS THE MANDATORY OBLIGATION

OF CHAPTER II ([3.]) ENFORCER, OF THE CHAPTER III ([3.]) ORDER, OF

CHAPTER III ([3.]) IMPOSER, SITTING AND EXISTING AS THE COURT OF

COMPETENT JURISDICTION ([SEE TEXT AT 846, 847. 1810]),

WITH THE ONLY PERMISSIBLE ACTION AGAINST SUCH A VIOLATION/BREACH OF

1446. THE 'RECOGNISED PATH OF DUE PROCESS' [SEE TEXT AT 1441. IBID], PURSUANT TO
 AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH RECOGNISED AND ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES, IS TO 'INVALIDATE
AND VOID FROM OPERATIONAL EFFECT' THOSE 'GAINED OUTCOMES' (WHICH THE
 S.A. GOVERNMENT 'ACQUIRED/ACHIEVED' [SEE TEXT AT 1443. IBID]), WHICH
 DO NOT EXIST WITH CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE ([1.]), WITH
 1447. PARTICULAR ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION AND QUALIFICATION THAT, 'IRRESPECTIVE OF
 ACTUAL WORDS IN S.A. STATUTE, WHICH STATE GOVERNMENT CLAIM GIVES
 AUTHORITY TO THE STATE GOVERNMENT TO PERFORM CERTAIN TASKS/ACTIONS
 1448. AGAINST DESIGNATED LIFERS', IF THE PARLIAMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA HAD
 COMPLIED WITH [28.], AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA HAD ONLY
 ACTED 'COMPLIANTLY' WITH ITS JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT AUTHORITY
 1449. (RATHER THAN 'INCOMPLIANTLY'), THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
 EFFECTED AGAINST LIFERS (AS DESCRIBED IN THIS DOCUMENT), BY SOUTH
 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING AGAINST ANDREWS [207.], WATSON
 [194.], AND ME [74.], COULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED AS THE 'RECOGNISED
 PATH OF DUE PROCESS' WOULD HAVE BEEN OBSERVED AND APPLIED ACCORDING TO
 COMPETENT LAW (EXAMPLE OF JURISDICTIONAL ERROR/ULTRA VIRES CONDUCT,
 FOUND IN [213.], AND QUITE SIGNIFICANTLY ALSO IN THE HIGH COURT OF
 AUSTRALIA WAS [210.]),

AND SO,

1450. 'TO INVALIDATE AND VOID FROM OPERATIONAL EFFECT' [SEE TEXT AT 1446. IBID],
 1451. 'OUTCOME GAINED IMPROPERLY' BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, 'AGAINST
 ANDREWS [207.] AND WATSON [194.] (AND OTHER SIMILARLY SENTENCED
 LIFERS [126.], WHO HAVE ALREADY BEEN REFUSED PAROLE-RELEASE BY STATE
 GOVERNMENT (ILLEGALLY REGARDED AS 'GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE ([29.], LIFERS)),
MUST BE DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO 'PATH. A.' OR 'PATH. B.', AS
 1452. DESCRIBED HEREIN, AND, WITH REGARD TO GOVERNMENT'S 'OUTCOME GAINED
 IMPROPERLY' 'AGAINST ME (WRONG AND FRAUDULENT DETERMINATION OF MY
 TRUE NPP DATE [SEE TEXT AT 938 TO 941. IBID]), MUST IMMEDIATELY
DUE PROCESS ME PER ANDREWS [207.], PAR. 20, AND [74.], AND 2009 NPP,

APPROXIMATELY, THEREBY QUALIFYING ME BEING FRAUDULENTLY IN PRISON SINCE APPROXIMATELY 2009 (EQUATING TO ME BEING A 'POLITICAL PRISONER' UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1.1]), WITH IMMEDIATE PATH. A. PAROLE-RELEASE ([77., 78., 79. AND 80.]), [RETURN TO 1410.]

1453.

NOT SURPRISINGLY,

WHEN MAPPED OUT FOR THE COMPETENT OBSERVER, HOW DAMAGING IT MIGHT APPEAR PUBLICLY, IF PATH. B. COURT APPLICATION [38. AND 40.], WAS JUDICIALLY RULED IN FAVOUR OF RESPECTIVE PAROLE-APPLICANT, THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY MIGHT SUFFER POLITICAL BACKLASH, BUT, FOR A LIFER SUCH AS ANDREWS [207.], WATSON [194.], OR ME [74.], TO HAVE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.1]) CREATED BARRIES TO OUR CONSTITUTIONAL [1.1] RIGHTS [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847. IBIP], IS SO RADICAL AND FUNDAMENTAL THAT I SUGGEST ONLY A ROYAL COMMISSION, AGAINST CONDUCT OF AND BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT, COULD WEED-OUT THE EXTENSIVE

1454.

'POISONING OF OUR STATUTE BOOK WITH UNCONSTITUTIONAL [1.1] AMENDMENTS' (SINCE [46.] OPERATIONAL START, PLUS ALL BILLS LINKED TO IT), SO THAT NOT JUST THE STATUTE AMENDMENTS AND NEW ACTS WOULD BE INVESTIGATED FOR COMPETENCE COMPLIANCE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION [1.1], BUT ALSO THE BILLS WHICH WERE EVENTUALLY ASSENTED [15.], PLUS, DUE TO JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS SUCH AS IN SELLECK JUDGMENT PROPER ([64.]), AT

1455.

PAR. 83 THEREIN, SECOND READING SPEECHES MAY BE USED BY A COURT WHERE IT IS APPROPRIATE TO HAVE REGARD TO ("BOTH COUNSEL AGREED THAT THIS COURT COULD HAVE REGARD TO SECOND READING SPEECHES WHERE IT THOUGHT APPROPRIATE, WITH

1456.

RESPECT TO THE LEGISLATION IN ISSUE."), 'HOWEVER, AND I STRESS WITH THE STRONGEST EMPHASIS, THAT IF THE SECOND READING AND/OR PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES/DISCUSSIONS ON THE TARGET STATUTE, ARE THEMSELVES UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL [1.1] COMPETENCE CHALLENGE, THEN THEY TOO MUST NOT BE REGARDED AS PROOF OF AUTHORITY IN THEIR WRITTEN WORDS',

CONSEQUENTIALLY,

1457.

INTRINSIC TO INVESTIGATION OF THE NUMEROUS SERIOUS COMPLAINTS DESCRIBED

1458.

AND IDENTIFIED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, AGAINST STATE PARLIAMENT, STATE GOVERNMENT, BILL PROPOSALS, STATUTE AMENDMENTS, RELATING TO HOW SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PERSONS ON BEHALF OF SA PARLIAMENT AND SA GOVERNMENT (AND ITS STATUTORY ENTITIES), GO ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCEMENT' [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847. IBID], WHAT STATE GOVERNMENT IS PERMITTED TO IMPOSE/ENFORCE AGAINST ANY 'LIFER-PRISONER', AND WHAT NOT PERMITTED TO IMPOSE/ENFORCE, AND WHAT MUST BE IMPOSED/ENFORCED (ETC.), AGAINST ANY PARTICULAR 'LIFER-PRISONER' (DEPENDING ON RESPECTIVE SENTENCE AND PROCESSES BEING

1459.

ENGAGED), INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATORS, WHETHER FULL COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, OR HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, MUST, DUE TO NATURE OF MATERS BEING INVESTIGATED, QUALIFY BY CONSTITUTIONAL [I.] STANDARDS, WHO HAD WHAT JURISDICTION, WHAT AUTHORITY, WHAT COMPETENCE, AT WHAT SPECIFIC TIME / ACTION / EVENT, WHY DID 'THEY' HAVE IT (COMPETENTLY), WHY DID 'OTHERS' NOT HAVE IT, WHAT WERE THE LIMITATIONS / SCOPE / RESTRICTIONS ATTRACTED TO AND BY IT, AND, WHAT ARE/WERE THE ONLY LAWFULLY POSSIBLE / PERMISSIBLE OUTCOMES / DECISIONS 'OPEN' TO RESPECTIVE ENTITIES / PARTIES / PERSONS / GOVERNMENT BODIES AT EACH 'COMPETENT STAGE OF DUE PROCESS' ASSOCIATED WITH AND LINKED TO SAID ACTIONS OF 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCEMENT'?;

1460.

PATH. B. IS A STATUTORY OBLIGATION UPON THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.7]), WHICH MUST BE COMPLIED WITH BY STATE GOVERNMENT IF PATH. A. PROCESS IS NOT THE INTENDED ACTION OF STATE GOVERNMENT, AND,

1461.

MUST BE PROMPTLY ACTIONED CONSISTENT WITH JUDICIAL STANDARDS LINKED TO SENTENCE APPEAL TIMEFRAMES, WHICH, BY COURT RULES, CRIMINAL LAW CONSOLIDATION ACT, S.A (1935), AND ASSOCIATED GUIDELINES, IS APPROXIMATELY ONE WHOLE CALENDER MONTH (THIRTY DAYS OR THEREABOUTS), AFTER THE PAROLE BOARD MAKES AN OFFICIAL DECISION (AT THE POINT NO LATER THAN DCS ACT S. 67 (6) "THE BOARD MAY..." [100.7]), THAT AT 'THAT' PARTICULAR TIME, WHILE PATH. A. AND PATH. B. OPTIONS ARE STILL AT DISCRETION OF STATE

1462.

GOVERNMENT (THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET APPLIED TO COURT [38. AND 40.]

1463.

AS ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN INCREASE TO EXISTING NPP, FROM WHICH THE COURT WOULD MAKE JUDGMENT, EITHER TO LEAVE EXISTING 'NPP DATE' AS IT IS, OR, FIX A 'NEW NPP DATE' (TO WHICH PAROLE APPLICATION WOULD BE INVALID, AS ONLY ONE PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION CAN BE SUBMITTED PER FIXED 'NPP DATE', AS EXPLAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT, WHICH LINKS TO DCS Act s. 67(9) OR s. 67(10) [107., 108. AND 109.], HAVING NO CONSTITUTIONAL [1.]

1464.

COMPETENCE TO BE ACTIONED AGAINST A LIFER SUCH AS ME [74.], ANDREWS [207.], OR WATSON [194.], ALSO BECAUSE, IF [107., 108. AND/OR 109.], COULD BE ^{COMPETENTLY} ~~APPLIED~~ APPLIED TO A LIFER LIKE ME [74.], THEN, WHAT WOULD BE THE POINT OF/FOR [38., 40. AND 45.], IF THE

1465.

STATE GOVERNMENT WAS PERMITTED TO TREAT ALL LIFERS AS IF THEY WERE SENTENCED TO GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE?), WHILE SUCH APPLICATION [38. AND 40.], HAS NOT BEEN ACTIONED, PATH. B. APPLICATION WHICH IS ONLY APPLICABLE TO ONE SPECIFICALLY FIXED (ALREADY EXISTING), NPP, IS STILL 'OPEN' FOR CONSIDERATION (BY STATE GOVERNMENT), BUT IT CAN ONLY EVER BE ACTIONED ONCE PER EXISTING NPP, SO THAT, IF COURT ~~DECIDES~~ DECIDES TO REJECT APPLICATION ([38. AND 40.]), THEN PAROLE-RELEASE (PATH. A.), MUST FOLLOW, AS SAID APPLICATION BY GOVERNMENT [38. AND 40.], CAN BE ACTIONED, WITHIN THE ESTABLISHED RULES OF DUE PROCESS, ONLY ONE TIME PER SINGLE 'NPP DATE' (OTHERWISE, ABUSE OF PROCESS WOULD BE IN EFFECT)),

1466.

THERE WOULD EXIST A 'LEGITIMATE PERIOD OF TIME' (ONE WHOLE CALENDER MONTH), FOR STATE GOVERNMENT TO SUBMIT ITS PATH. B. APPLICATION TO THE COURT ([38. AND 40.]), PARTICULARLY CONSIDERING PART OF THE PAROLE BOARD'S ASSESSMENT OF PAROLE APPLICATION (FROM A LIFER-APPLICANT), IS FORM OF NOTIFICATION TO THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES MINISTER (SITING MEMBER), AND

1467.

THEREFORE MINISTERIAL KNOWLEDGE OF PAROLE-APPLICANT'S INTENTIONS, **BUT**, SO AS TO ENSURE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT TAKE IMPROPER/FRAUDULENT ADVANTAGE OF SAID PATH. B. PROCESS PERIOD TO SUBMIT TO THE

1468.

COURT ([38. AND 40.]), IF, AFTER THE 'LEGITIMATE PERIOD OF TIME' HAS BEEN MET, WITH NO APPLICATION BY ~~GOVERNMENT~~ GOVERNMENT ([38. AND 40.]),

1469. BEING SUBMITTED, THERE MUST NOT EXIST ANY 'LIMBO DETRIMENT' UPON RESPECTIVE
 1470. LIFER-APPLICANT, SO THEN, CONSEQUENTIAL TO SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT
 'NOT SUBMITTING' APPLICATION ([38. AND 40.]), WITHIN SAID 'LEGITIMATE PERIOD
 OF TIME', RESPECTIVE LIFERS' PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION MUST THEN RETURN TO
 PROCESSING BY PAROLE BOARD, DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL ABOVE [SEE TEXT
 AT 1398. IBID],

THEREFORE,

1471. IRRESPECTIVE OF PATH. B. ACTIONED TO COURT JUDGMENT, OR, PATH. B. BEING
 INITIALLY 'ACTIVATED', BUT DISCONTINUED PRIOR TO COURT'S JUDGMENT, THEN
 AUTOMATICALLY REVERTING TO 'PAROLE-RELEASE DETERMINATION, PENDING
 DCS ACT S. 67(6)(A) (START POINT [100.])', THERE EXISTS A CLEAR LINE OF
 STATUTORY DUE PROCESS, PER COMPETENTLY CONSTRUCTED STATUTES,
 CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] APPLICABLE TO ME [74.], AND LIFERS INCLUDING
 ANDREWS [207.], WATSON [194.], AND OTHER LIFERS IN SIMILAR
 SENTENCING SITUATIONS AS THEM,

UNFORTUNATELY THOUGH,

1472. THOUGH OUR COURT IMPOSED COMPETENT SENTENCES ([74., 194. AND 207.]),
 WERE CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] PROTECTED UPON IMPOSITION OF SAME,
 INTRINSIC TO WHICH WERE CERTAIN ACCRUED RIGHTS (SUBSTANTIVE LAW
 PROTECTION OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS), WHICH, UPON COMPETENT
IDENTIFICATION OF [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847. IBID], MUST BE
PROPERLY OBSERVED AND ~~APPLIED~~ APPLIED BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT

1473. (CH. II [3.]), 'THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA CONSIDERS ITSELF
 AND ITS STATE PARLIAMENTS, AND ACTS ALONG SAME WAY, TO BE MORE
 POWERFUL THAN THE CONSTITUTION [1.], THE JUDICATURE ([3.] CH. III),
 AND EVEN THE RULE OF LAW, AS IS EVIDENCED IN QUALIFIABLE DESCRIPTION

1474. WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, OF 'STATE GOVERNMENT'S DISREGARD OF THEIR
 CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]) RESTRICTIONS TO THEIR ACTIONS (RE THE
 ENFORCEMENT OF SENTENCES ON LIFERS [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847. IBID]),
 TOWARDS LIFERS SUCH AS ME [74.], ANDREWS [207.], AND WATSON [194.],

1475. BUT ALSO, IF PARTICULAR COURTS OF CLAIMED COMPETENCE (SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR WATSON [194.7], HAD COMPETENTLY IDENTIFIED RELEVANT JURISDICTIONS, RELEVANT AUTHORITIES, RELEVANT PROCEDURAL/SUBSTANTIVE/ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, etc. RELATING TO IMPOSED LIFE'S SENTENCES, RATHER THAN BELIEVE THE FALSE CLAIMS AND PROFESSIONAL LIES TOLD BY STATE'S COUNSEL TO THE COURT (IN THE WATSON JUDICIAL REVIEW [194.7], SOME OF WHICH I'VE IDENTIFIED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, LIFE'S LIKE ME [74.7], ANDREWS [207.7], WATSON [194.7], AND OTHERS LIKE-SAME TREATED BY CORRUPT STATE GOVERNMENT, WOULD NOT BE ILLEGALLY SENTENCED DIRECTLY, BY STATE PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.7], AND STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.7], AND IN FACT OUR EXISTING COURT SENTENCES (IF COMPETENTLY IMPOSED), WOULD LAWFULLY REMAIN AS OUR ONLY CUSTODIAL SENTENCES, AND, THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY 'NPP DATE' OR 'NPP OF TIME' CREATED AND ACTIONED AGAINST US (EXAMPLE, DC5 Act ss. 67(9), 67(10) [107, 108, AND 109.7], BY ANY ACTIONS OF PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.7], OR STATE (CH. II [3.7], BECAUSE, ONLY A CH. III (CH. I [3.7], COMPETENT COURT HOLDS CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION (LI, 3, AND 45.7], TO CREATE AND IMPOSE AND DELIVER ANY CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCE UPON LIFE'S SUCH AS ME [74.7], ANDREWS [207.7], AND WATSON [194.7], WITHIN SOUTH AUSTRALIAN COMPETENT SENTENCING LAWS ([SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 847.7, 848.7]);
1478. PATH, B, OPTION, AS DESCRIBED IN THIS DOCUMENT (PATH, A, OR, PATH, B, [SEE TEXT AT 1391, 1392, 1393, 1394, 1395, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399, 1400 AND 1401, 1402.7]), EXISTS AS THE ONLY OTHER OPTION PERMITTED TO SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, IF PATH, A, IS NOT ACTIVATED [SEE TEXT AT 1398, 1401.7, PLUS, SECTION 33A OF THE SENTENCING ACT IS NOT SOUGHT BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL ([194.7] (PARA. 39.7.7]), AND, FORMS PART OF THE FLOW OF COMPETENT DUE PROCESS, ([SEE TEXT AT 1421, 1422, 1423, 1424, 1425, 1434, 1435 AND 1436, 1437.7], SO THAT, IF PATH, A, IS NOT DUE PROCESSED (BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT), TO PAROLE-RELEASE OF RESPECTIVE LIFE-R-APPLICANT,

AND THERE IS NO APPLICATION TO THE COURT BY STATE GOVERNMENT (SECTION 32 OR 33A [194. (PARA. 39.)]), THEN, RESPECTIVE LIEER-APPLICANT BECOMES THE VICTIM OF PROCEDURAL UNFAIRNESS AND PROCEDURAL IMPROPRIETY,

DIRECTLY CONSEQUENTIAL TO SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT VIOLATING THE PROCEDURAL, SUBSTANTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW(S) STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS, OBSERVATIONS AND APPLICATIONS (OF), AND COMMON LAW

ADDITIONS RELATING TO SAME, WHICH RESPECTIVE LIEER-APPLICANT (SUCH AS ME [74.], ANDREWS [207.], AND WATSON [194.]), OWNS THE ACCRUED

RIGHT (SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT), TO ENFORCEMENT OF, AS MANDATED BY

CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT AND PERMISSIBLE (LI.), CUSTODIAL SENTENCE

ENFORCEMENT BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT? [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847.

IBID.] (WHERE COMPETENT SENTENCING STANDARDS HAVE BEEN IMPOSED UPON

RESPECTIVE LIEER ALSO), THEREFORE, WHEN STATE GOVERNMENT ENGAGES

IN CONDUCT WHICH IS NOT PATH. A, OR, PATH. B, OR SECTION 33A APPLICATION

([194. (PARA. 39.)]), BUT INSTEAD ACTIONS DCS ACT. S. 67(9) [107. AND 108.],

AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIEER PAROLE-APPLICANT, SUCH AS ANDREWS [207.] AND

WATSON [194.], CREATING A FALSE NEW INCARCERATION SENTENCE [SEE TEXT

AT 1443. IBID.], IT IS NOT PURSUANT TO ACCRUED RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS IMPOSED

UPON RESPECTIVE LIEER BY THE COURT, NOR ACTIONS WHICH ARE

CONSTITUTIONALLY [LI.] PERMISSIBLE, AND ARE THEREFORE ILLEGAL,

SO THEN,

A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION MUST NO LONGER GO UNANSWERED, BEING,

IF CONSTITUTION [LI.], AND SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION AND COMMON LAW

EXIST, AND THEREIN DEFINE PERMISSIBLE CONDUCT BY SOUTH

AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, TOWARDS INCARCERATED LIEERS, LIKE ME [74.],

ANDREWS [207.], AND WATSON [194.], AND INCORPORATED WITHIN SAME

STATUTES AND COMMON LAWS ARE WRITTEN AND WORDED PROTECTIONS

(OWNED BY RESPECTIVE LIEERS), AND OBLIGATIONS (OF OBSERVANCE OF RESPECTIVE

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS), WHICH SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENTS AND SOUTH

AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT MUST ABIDE BY, AS PART OF AND FORM OF THE FLOW

1483.

OF COMPETENT DUE PROCESS, FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT AND PERMISSIBLE CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCEMENT[?] BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, AGAINST SAID LIFEERS, THEN WHY HAS THE STATE PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.7]), AND STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.7]), BEEN ABLE TO ACT AND OPERATE WELL OUTSIDE CONSTITUTIONAL (C1.7) LEGALITY AND JURISDICTION (AS DESCRIBED THROUGHOUT THIS

1484.

DOCUMENT), WITH NO CHECKS AND BALANCES AGAINST THEIR PERFUNCTORY ABUSE OF POWER AND AUTHORITY ([45., 64., 65., 82. AND 83.])? WHY HAVE A CONSTITUTION [1.] IF SA GOVERNMENTS (CH. II [3.7]), GET TO, AND CONTINUE TO ACT OUTSIDE IT ([1.]), WHILE FALSELY CLAIMING THEY ARE ACTING LAWFULLY FROM WITHIN IT ([1.]), AND THEN DISMISS-OFF MY FORMAL COMPLAINTS DIRECTING SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF

1485.

THEIR UNCONSTITUTIONAL [1.] CONDUCT? THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE SA PARLIAMENTS' AND SA GOVERNMENTS' CONDUCT, SINCE AT LEAST 1994, AS IDENTIFIED, HIGHLIGHTED ~~AND~~ AND DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, MAY WELL HAVE NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE, UPON REVIEW OF THIS COMPLAINT BY A COMPETENT COURT, AND IF THAT IS TRUE THEN WHO IS REALLY TO BLAME WHEN

1486.

STATE/TERRITORY PARLIAMENTS, AND/OR STATE/TERRITORY GOVERNMENTS ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1.]? EVEN THOUGH STATE GOVERNMENT MINISTER CLEARLY STIPULATED TO ME BY LETTER (DATED 22-5-2012, REF: 12 MCS 0110, MINISTER FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, J. RANKING MP), "AS THE ISSUE YOU HAVE RAISED IS A LEGAL MATTER ... ANY DISPUTE YOU MAY HAVE WITH THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION AS IT RELATES TO YOUR NON-PAROLE PERIOD IS A MATTER FOR THE COURTS TO RESOLVE.", WITHIN SAME LETTER

1487.

FROM THE MINISTER (NOT FROM A COMPETENT COURT RULING, VIA JUDICIAL (CH. III [3.7]), INVESTIGATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] AUTHORITY OF S.A. GOVERNMENTS' ACTIONS TOWARDS ME, IN CONSEQUENCE OF [74.] JUDGMENT, BUT INSTEAD VIA A CH. II [3.7] STATE INSTRUMENTALITY, WHO TRIED TO SHRUG-OFF MY REPEATED COMPLAINTS AGAINST THEIR FALSE CALCULATION OF MY NPP, AND THEIR LACK OF AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH DECISION WITHIN

CH. II [3.1], was quoted from S.A. Parole Board, "I am advised the Parole Board wrote to you on 7 June 2010 explaining in detail how your non-parole period is calculated in accordance with current legislation."

so that,

irrespective of the Minister acknowledging that, only a Court (which exists only in CH. III [3.1]), is authorised to resolve statutory interpretation challenges, and, non-parole period interpretation challenges (relating to me and my 2002 [74.1 re-sentencing), the Minister does absolutely nothing about actually getting a Chapter III [3.1] Court to, at least, write a report (or something), re my complaint of criminal abuse of authority, in SA. Government's change to the meaning of the words of my 2002 judgment [74.1].

therefore,

1489. if, as an incarcerated life, in the state custody of the South Australian Government, but I then formally and repeatedly accuse that same Government of ultra vires conduct, specifically relating to same incarceration, and no Court investigation of matter is sought by same Government, considering they accuse me of being wrong, and repeat their claim that they are legally right, since when did the Constitution [1.1] enable S.A. Government to veto criminal sentencing Court jurisdiction, and, increase my penalty of Courts imposed npr, by any operation, of any section, of any South Australian statute? [see text at 1390. 1490]

1491. No matter how you assess this Complaint Report Document, as far as the illegal conduct alleged by me, against Agents representing the South Australian

GOVERNMENT (THE ACTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL PERSONS, THEIR STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS [14.], THEIR STATE INSTRUMENTALITY [33.], MEMBERS OF STATE PARLIAMENTS AND ALL THEIR 'INVOLVED' STAFFERS), WHAT IS EVIDENCED IN DOCUMENT QUALIFICATION IS THAT IT IS NO SIMPLE TASK TO MERELY READ THIS DOCUMENT, RESEARCH STATUTE AND COMMON LAW (JUDGMENTS), AND HANSARD REFERENCED HEREIN, AND CONCLUDE MY COMPLAINT (RE NPP DATE, PAROLE RELEASE YEAR, POLITICAL PRISONER, FRAUDULENT/ FALSE STATUTE, ETC), TO BE NOT ONLY VALID BUT ALSO HAVE SUSTAINABLE MERIT, BECAUSE THE PEOPLE WHO ARGUE FOR THEIR CLIENTS IN A COURTROOM (LAWYERS), AND THE TRUE ARBITERS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW JUSTICE SYSTEM (JUDGES), ARE THE ONES WHO ARE CRITICALLY INTRINSIC TO THE TRUE VALUE AND WEIGHT, OF THE PRESERVATION OF JUDICIAL PROGRESS WITH COMPETENCE, BY ENSURING THAT WHEN POINTS OF LAW, COMMON AND STATUTE, ARE ARGUED/CHALLENGED IN A COURT OF LAW, THAT ALL RESPECTIVE STATUTE (LONG-STANDING AND RECENT AMENDMENTS), EXISTING WITHIN SOUTH AUSTRALIAN BOOK OF STATUTES, UNDER CHALLENGE, ARE AT LEAST 1492. CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]), COMPETENT IN THEIR CONSTRUCTION ([13.]). IT IS A CHANGE IN THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE LAWYERS AND JUDGES, FROM PERFUNCTORY REGARD TO EXISTING (RELEVANT), SECTIONS OF STATUTE, TO, LOOKING AT WHETHER RESPECTIVE SECTIONS OF STATUTE ARE CONSTRUCTED (ALL MATTERS OF CONSTRUCTION, INCLUDING CLARITY IN WORDING), COMPLIANTLY WITH CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]), CONVENTIONS (WHICH ALSO INCORPORATES [13.], AND APPRECIATION FOR THE EXPRESS RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON CHAPTER I, II AND III ([3.]) COMPETENCE AND PERMISSIBILITY), WHICH WILL OPEN THE EYES OF THE MANY (WHO FOR MANY YEARS HAVE MISSED WHAT IS REVEALED IN THIS DOCUMENT, ABOUT SOME EXISTING SOUTH AUSTRALIAN STATUTES, AND ASSOCIATED COMMON LAWS), SEEDED FROM THE ACTIONS OF ONE (ME, AND THE CREATION OF THIS DOCUMENT).

1493. ONE OF THE FOUNDATION ELEMENTS OF THE ACTIONS (COMPLAINED ABOUT WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT), DONE BY SA PARLIAMENTS (CH. I [3.]), AND SA GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), AGAINST ME (A LIFER, SENTENCED BY COMPETENT COURT, ACCORDING TO [74.]), WITH 'SOME' SAID ACTIONS BEING SPECIFICALLY FOCUSED AT/TOWARDS ME, AND 'OTHER' SUCH

ACTIONS SIMPLY ENVELOPING ME IN THEIR ENGAGEMENT/OPERATION (SUCH AS THE ARBITRARY OPERATION OF [46.] IRRESPECTIVE OF EVERYTHING AND ANYTHING DONE OR SAID, WHICH, BY LAW IS ERRONEOUS (IN FORM AND PRINCIPLE), [64. (PARA. 117.)], YET, IT IS THAT BELIEF AND ALLEGED CONFERENCE OF AND BY STATE PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT, WHICH ENABLED THEM TO EFFECT THE DECISIONS/ACTIONS DONE BY THEM, WHICH ARE THE TARGET OF MY COMPLAINTS

1994. DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT), IS, THEIR CLAIM AND BELIEF THAT ~~THE~~ WHAT THEY DID WAS LAWFULLY DONE, FROM THE FULL WORKING AND OPERATIONAL INTENTIONS OF [46, 103, 103, 104, AND 105.] TO THE CHANGE TO THE OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT

[46., 102., 103., 104., AND 105.] , TO THE CHANGE TO THE OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS (UPON THE SA. GOVERNMENT, CH. II [3.]), STIPULATED BY THE FULL COURT IN MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74., 79., 80., 78. AND 77.] ;

The SA Parliament (Ch. I E.3.1), and SA Government (Ch. II E.3.1), must therefore be able to prove, to the Constitutional C.I.1 Validation and Qualification, that 'their', 'conduct/actions' (as complained about by me within this Document), held Competent Jurisdiction, Authority and Power, except, no such competence exists and so the requisite Validation and Qualification

1496. CAN NEVER BE HELD OR PROVEN. THE PROOF IN SUPPORT OF SUCH A STATEMENT BY ME, IS IN A PROPER, COMPETENT AND LEGALLY QUALIFIABLE ASSESSMENT OF [I.] ANDREWS

Judgment Proper [207.] PARAGRAPH 20. THEREIN, PARAGRAPH 21. THEREIN, [50.] [74.] DCS Act [85.] (Versions operation at 1992, 1994 (post [46.] SENCING Act [84.] (Versions operation at 1992, 2002), Watson Judgment Proper [194.] (in full), [208.] [13., 16., 17., 18., 19., 20., 21., 22., 23., 24., 27., 28., 29. AND 30.] [34., 35., 36., 37., 38., 40., 43., 44. AND 45.] [49.] [51.] (in full), [64. AND 65.] [66.] (in full), [82. AND 83.] (in full), [87., 94., 100., 101., 102., 103., 104., 105., 106., 107., 108., 109., 110., 111., 112. AND 113.] [140.] (in full), [162.] (in full), [179.] (in full), [187.] (in full), [198.] [208.] (in full), [209.] (in full), [210.] (in full), [211.] (in full), [212.] (in full), [213.] (in full), AND OTHER RELEVANT TEXTS. THE SUSTAINABLE POINT IN ISSUE, IS NOT THAT I HAVE A VALID AND MERITORIOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST SA Gov (REG. HOW THEY HAVE DEALT WITH ENFORCEMENT OF MY SENTENCE [74.], CREATION OF ILLEGAL STATE [46.], MISHANDLED MY RELATED

COMPLAINTS ABOUT SAME, AND ~~RECEIVED~~ ENGAGED IN MATTERS ~~RECEIVED~~ ULTRA VIRES [82. AND 83.]

1498. INCLUDING, FAKE-NRP DATE AND PERIOD OF TIME, IT IS THAT THEIR SAID CONDUCT/ACTIONS, EVEN HAPPENED AT ALL, ESPECIALLY DUE TO THE FACT OF EXISTING STATUTE AND COMMON

LAW (WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO THE JURISDICTIONAL REGULATOR (C.I.1), AND ITS STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS UPON SOUTH AUSTRALIA (CH. I C.3.1), STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II C.3.1)), AS MANDATED BY C.I. (C.3.1), THE PARENT AUSTRALIAN LAW), WHICH, IF CONSTITUTIONALLY (C.I.1), COMPLIED WITH (IN OTHER WORDS, IF THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA HAD ONLY ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (C.I.1), NONE OF MY COMPLAINTS HEREIN (DESCRIBED AGAINST SA PARLIAMENT AND SA GOVERNMENT), WOULD EVEN EXIST, AS THE IMPROPER CONDUCT/ACTIONS COMPLAINED ABOUT BY ME WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN, AND I WOULD ALSO NOT BE THE VICTIM OF.

1499. THE PREMISE FOR THE SA GOVERNMENT ACTING/ENGAGING IN MATTERS SO COMPLAINED OF AND ABOUT, BY ME, HEREIN, IS THEIR LEGAL RIGHT TO SO ACT, HOWEVER, SAID PREMISE DOES NOT ACTUALLY EXIST, CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED SO AS TO SUPPORT WHAT THEY HAVE ALREADY DONE TO ME (AND CONTINUE TO DO TO ME ALSO), NOR COULD IT POSSIBLY BE CREATED RETROSPECTIVELY [27], BECAUSE THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA DOES NOT HAVE THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT ABILITY, WITHIN STATE OPERATIONS (CH. I AND II C.3.1), TO CREATE CONSTITUTIONAL (C.I.1) CHANGES, TO THE OPERATION OF C.I.1, TO INCREASE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY OUTSIDE THEIR DESIGNATED CHAPTER OPERATIONS (CH. I, II, III C.3.1). IRONICALLY, IT IS THE CONSTITUTION C.I.1 ITSELF, WHICH DENIES THE EXISTENCE OF THE PREMISE WHICH THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA CLAIMS TO HOLD. SA PARLIAMENT AND SA GOVERNMENT WILL DECLARE THAT, AT NO TIME DID THEY TRY/ATTEMPT TO EXCEED THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION (C.I. AND 3.1), BUT,

1501. A COMPOSITE AND COMPETENT READING OF THIS DOCUMENT, WILL CLEARLY IDENTIFY SOME OF THE SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL C.I.1 AUTHORITY, ENGAGED IN BY SA PARLIAMENT AND SA GOVERNMENT (EXAMPLE, [46] NOT EMPOWERING PAROLE BOARD TO REFUSE PAROLE TO LIFE (LIKE ANDREWS [207]), THEN OPERATE DCS ACT S. 67(9) (AND CREATE A NEW NRP DATE AND NEW NRP OF TIME), [107, AND 108], AS A TERM OF SENTENCE CANT BE CREATED/IMPOSED LIFE, OTHER THAN WITHIN COURT [38]. AND 40.1, EXCEPT THAT ANDREWS [207] DID SUFFER THOSE ACTIONS OF DCS ACT S. 67(9)).

1502. I suspect that the SA Parliament and SA Government, when considering, effecting

and operationally enforcing 'matters' relating to 'parole for life' in South Australia, cultivate their erroneous belief that 'parole applications are merely and purely

procedural law related', therefore, application of retrospectivity does not occur as it is only considered prospective (and can also, therefore, be operationally

applied to all current ~~the~~ serving life's, sentenced prior to enactment of such 'matter being amended'). An example in [49], wherein counsel for the State of

South Australia (incorporating conduct by Parliament (statute amendment), then applied and enforced by State Government), states to the High Court that 'the Act ([85.1], has no retrospective operation' [196.1], which in fact is a false

statement to the court in one respect, and a true statement in a different respect. From said 'example text', the 'true statement' is that said amendments

(subject matter re home detention), do not hold authority to be operationally applied prior to their designated enactment start date (see [27.1], specific wording therein s. 21 "whether expressed in the present or the future tense"

but does not stipulate 'past tense', therefore, must only be applied to the 'now', ('present'), the 'later day/tomorrow', ('future'), but not the 'yesterday', ('past'), see strict requirements for rules of construction of statute, 'negative provision' and 'positive provision', described in [64.1], and, having no authority

to be operationally applied prior to said 'start date', also means there must not be any operational encroachment upon any accrued/substantive sentencing standards rights (incorporated within sentencing standards which a competency sitting sentencing court imposes upon person being sentenced), which were in

operation prior to said start date. However, if a relevant accrued/substantive sentencing right, held associated relevance to which attention may be attracted, by administrative operation of said amendment (subject matter re home detention), after start date, and, consequently, operational effect of new amendment

actually resulted in denial of outcome (benefit), of operation of pre-existing (repealed), section of statute, and said pre-existing 'benefit' was no longer available, permitted, allowed due to said new amendment, it will be fundamental to

1508. SAID 'BENEFIT' BORNE FROM SAME (WHEREBY SAID 'BENEFIT' MAY INCORPORATE MORE THAN IDENTIFY THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTER OF SAID PRE-EXISTING SECTION OF STATUTE, AND ENFORCEMENT AGAINST RESPECTIVE PRISONER, BY SA GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.7, [85.7])), TO THE VALIDITY AND OPERATIONAL COMPETENCE OF THE 'NEW AMENDMENT' (UPON SENTENCE

151. If a new amendment (by its operation), does not hold operational authority, to operationally encroach upon the jurisdictional operation of a pre-existing section of statute (consequential to said pre-existing section of statute having the combined character of right accrued in substantive law, plus, right accrued in procedural law, to protect application enforcement of the accrued right (by way of administrative law observance of due process) (procedural law), according to law (210. (Judgment proper, para. 101 therein, and apply similar effect of, to the current point, wherein, if the premise of said new amendment, to operate against (all) prisoners from start date onwards [see text at 1505. (ibid)] cannot be established, then, the jurisdiction of operation of the pre-existing section of statute cannot be impaired/void, so then, it must continue to be operational until its operational end upon completion of sentence of respective prisoner (life), in other words, if the government can't prove to the constitutionally (11.1) compliant standard (of measure), that it is actually allowed (per 11.1), to apply the operational effect of such new amendment, against respective prisoner (life), and in doing so, invalidate operational effect of section of statute so repealed,

1514. 'INCLUDING ALL SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS INCORPORATED THEREIN (BEING EXPUNGED FROM OPERATIONAL APPLICATION TOO)', THEN, SAID PREMISE CLAIMED BY STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED, THEREFORE, SAID 'PRE-EXISTING SECTION OF STATUTE' MUST CONTINUE TO OPERATE FOR RESPECTIVE PRISONER
1515. (LIFER). THE JUDGMENT PROPER, FOR PINDER [208.] (IN FULL), IS IDEAL FOR
1516. EXPLAINING SUCH A POINT IN ISSUE, NOT ONLY TOWARDS 'RIGHT TO EXERCISE AN ACCRUED RIGHT (IN MY SITUATION THAT WOULD RELATE TO OPERATED EFFECT OF 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS TO MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.])', AS AT THE FIRST INSTANCE SUCH ACCRUED RIGHT CAN LAWFULLY BE EXERCISED', BUT ALSO, THAT, DEPENDING ON THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF A PARTICULAR POINT IN ISSUE, RE EXISTING SECTION OF STATUTE ('NEW AMENDMENT'),
1517. OR, PRE-EXISTING SECTION OF STATUTE, 'AN ACCRUED RIGHT ACQUIRED AFTER A STATUTORY EVENT, IS IN EVERY SENSE A RIGHT, EVEN THOUGH IT ARISES UNDER AN ACT WHICH IS PROCEDURAL, AND, IT IS NOT TO BE TAKEN AWAY (BY PARLIAMENT), BY CONFERRING ON THE STATUTE A RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION, AS PARLIAMENT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DECIDE ON A POINT IN ISSUE, WHICH CAN ONLY BE HEARD AND DETERMINED
1518. IN A COURT OF LAW', AND, THAT, 'WHERE SUBJECT MATTER IN ISSUE IS FORM OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT, NO PROCESS RELATING TO ITS OPERATION, APPLICATION, ENFORCEMENT, OR EVEN ITS CARRY-ON EXISTENCE IS MERELY PROCEDURAL AS IT INCORPORATES ADMINISTRATION (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW), OPERATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ENTITLEMENTS (RIGHTS)', WITHIN THE PROCESSES OF DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO LAW (PROCEDURAL LAW).
1519. IT DOES NOT MATTER HOW MANY DIFFERENT WAYS, WITH HOWEVER MANY DIFFERENT EXAMPLES, I PRESENT AND PROVIDE EVIDENCE, ARGUMENT, PROOF, THAT THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]) HAS ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1.], 'ENGAGED IN ACTIONS WHICH HAD, AND CONTINUE TO HAVE, A DETRIMENTAL IMPACT ON MY COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE [74.], AND ON ME PERSONALLY, AS THE VICTIM OF SUCH
1520. UNCONSTITUTIONAL 'ACTIONS'. IF THE PARENT LAW OF AUSTRALIA ([1.]), DOES NOT EMPOWER THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (INCORPORATING CH. I AND II, [3.]), TO SO ACT, AND IN SUCH ACTIONS DESCRIBED HEREIN, 'CAUSE ME TO BE WRONGED AGAINST TO A CRIMINAL STANDARD (ACTING OUTSIDE AND IN VIOLATION OF [1.])', THEN, MY CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]), EMPOWERING RIGHTS (WHICH WERE VIOLATED/STOLEN, AS

DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT), MUST BE ARGUED COMPETENTLY IN THE HOUSE OF LAW (CH. III [3.]), FREED FROM THEIR SILENCE, WHICH THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]) CREATED IN ITS STATE PARLIAMENT AND STATE GOVERNMENT CONDUCT ULTRA VIRES [45., 82. AND 83.].

1521. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT COMPONENT WHICH CANNOT EVER BE HELD IN CH. II [3.] (THE SA GOVERNMENT), IS THE COMPETENT JURISDICTION 'TO DETERMINE' OR EVEN 'TO CHANGE' THE TRUE ENFORCEABLE MEANING, OF THE WORDS OF MY 2002
1522. JUDGMENT [74.]. THEREFORE, IF SA GOVERNMENT 'DETERMINATION', OF WHAT THEY REGARD AS THE 'COURT'S [74.] INTENDED MEANING OF THE EFFECTIVE LENGTH OF MY
1523. NPP [SEE TEXT AT 938 TO 941. IBID], DUE TO SAID SA GOVERNMENT 'DETERMINATION' BEING CONSIDERED/ASSESSED/DECIDED IN CH. II [3.] ONLY, EXCEPT THAT CH. II [3.], CANNOT EVER HOLD, ENABLE, PERMIT OR CREATE THE PRE-REQUISITE CONDITIONS FOR SUCH COMPETENT JURISDICTION, AS THAT SPECIFIC JURISDICTION (TO ASSESS AND THEN 'DETERMINE'), CAN ONLY EVER EXIST IN CH. III [3.], BECAUSE IT CAN ONLY BE HELD BY A COMPETENT COURT OF LAW, IS NOT CREATED WITHIN COMPETENT JURISDICTION, THEN CONSEQUENTIALLY TOO, NO VALID/COMPETENT AUTHORITY CAN EXIST TO MAKE
1524. THE ACTUAL 'DETERMINATION' EITHER ([82. AND 83.]). NO VALID CREATION CAN LAWFULLY EXIST PER [1.], THE REQUISITE FOUNDATION, IN THIS INSTANCE WOULD MEAN A CH. III COMPETENT COURT ([3.]), IF A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION CANNOT EVER EXIST IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WITHOUT A JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT (OR HIGHER RANK, SUCH AS HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA), AS ONLY A JUSTICE OF SUPREME COURT (OR HIGHER), CAN LAWFULLY CREATE ANY DETERMINATION OF A LIFER'S SENTENCE (WHICH INCLUDES NPP [194. (PARA. II.)]), WITHIN STATE COURT BOUNDARIES (TRIAL COURT OF SENTENCE (SUPREME COURT, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION), FULL
1525. COURT OF SA/ APPEAL COURT (CRIMINAL JURISDICTION)), ([192.]), AND, NO CRIMINAL COURT JURISDICTION CAN COMPETENTLY EXIST, LET ALONE OPERATE/FUNCTION, PER [1.] 'SEPARATION OF POWER' (POWER BEING THE RIGHT TO ACT WITHIN A SPECIFIC 'CHAPTER' JURISDICTION), IN CHAPTER I [3.] OR CHAPTER II [3.], WITHOUT
1526. EXCEPTION [3., 4., 6. AND 7.], SO THAT WITHIN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, NO CH. II [3.] CREATED 'NPP DATE', 'NPP OF TIME' CAN COMPETENTLY BE CREATED OR UPHELD OR ENFORCED,

1527. AS THERE IS NO JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE INTRINSICALLY CONSEQUENTIAL TO NO JURISDICTION, NO AUTHORITY TO SO ACT, AGAINST A LIFER SUCH AS ME [74.1], BECAUSE OF THE COURT SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON ME... AS A LIFER. THE SA GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.1], CAN NEVER CREATE/IMPOSE A 'NPP DATE' (AS CHARACTERISED/DEFINED BY ITS OPERATION), OR 'NPP OF TIME' (AS CHARACTERISED/DEFINED BY ITS OPERATION), AGAINST ME AS A LIFER [74.1], EXCEEDING PENALTY OF SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE COURT IN 2002 [74.1], AS [1.1] PROHIBITS SUCH AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTION BY A STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.1], WHICH IS ALSO WHY STATE EXISTS TO EXTEND MY EXISTING COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE, IF STATE GOVERNMENT WISHES TO DO SO [38. AND 40.1]. THE PROCESS OF SENTENCE INCREASE MUST BE DONE VIA STATUTORY PROCESSES, AS CRIMINAL JURISDICTION SENTENCES (WHICH INCORPORATES NPP), ARE CREATIONS OF AND IN STATUTE [210. (PARAS. 54, 57.1)], WHERE THE ACT TITLE ITSELF, INFORMS OF ITS COMPETENT JURISDICTION ([84.1], THE CRIMINAL SENTENCE, IN CRIMINAL COURTS, CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) ACT 1988, SA).

1528. IF [38, 40, 44, AND 45.1], ARE ACTIONED, THEY ARE AN APPEAL AGAINST EXISTING NPP (WHEN ACTIONED AGAINST LIFER, IN SA), AND SENTENCE APPEALS (THEIR ESTABLISHED STATUTORY PROCESSES), AS AN ACTION, EMPLOY 'CAUSE OF ACTION' AND 'RIGHT OF ACTION' FROM CLCA [31.1], AND CLSA [34.1] ([210. (PARAS. 54, 57.1)], NEITHER OF WHICH CAN BE HEARD ANYWHERE IN CH. II [3.1], OR WITHIN ANY ACT ([85.1], EXISTING WITHIN CH. II [3.1] WHICH DEALS WITH LIFER PRISONERS, ONLY IN CH. III [3.1], WHICH IS ALSO WHY PCS ACT S. 67(9) CANNOT BE OPEN TO APPLICATION AGAINST ME ([80.1], DUE TO MY IMPOSED SENTENCE [74.1] (THE BOARD CANNOT HEAR, CONSIDER, DETERMINE ANY NPP INCREASE/ARGUMENT ETC. AGAINST ME... IT HAS NO COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO DO SO). A 'NPP OF TIME' (LEADING UP TO 'NPP DATE'), AGAINST ME, AS A LIFER, BEING OPEN FOR DETERMINATION/CREATION AND IMPOSITION UPON ME, CAN ONLY EVER BE HEARD AND DETERMINED IN A CH. III [3.1] COURT OF LAW, AND IS NOT OPEN TO CH. I AND CH. II ([3.1], AND, SUCH IS THE AUTHORITY OF [1.1] THAT, ANY REAL OR ARTIFICIAL (NOT EVEN REGARDED AS SUCH BY SA GOVERNMENT, YET IS ACTED UPON BY SA GOVERNMENT AS IF WAS CREATED/IMPOSED WITH CONSENT FROM THE CONSTITUTION [1.1]),

1537. The Parent Law of Australia exists as [1.] [see text at 1530, ibid.]
1538. [1.] enables (as described in [3.], jurisdiction held to sentence me [74.], below)
1539. CHAPTER I (jurisdiction to create, impose, enforce sentence, not exist)
1540. CHAPTER II (jurisdiction of SA Gov. within [85.] is administrative, enforce)
1541. CHAPTER III (jurisdiction of sentencing court is criminal, impose only)
1533. Watson [194.], is that all matters borne from operation/application of DCS Act [85.], are restricted to administrative law only, and cannot jurisdictionally operate any criminal law investigations/outcomes, as Administrative Law is the competent limit (per Ch. II [3.]), whilst
1534. enforcing an imposed sentence upon a lifer (so that any creation, imposition, enforcement of any thing, which in its operation equates to a NRP date/NRP of time, as effected by operation of DCS Act ss. 67(9), 67(9)(B), 67(9)(C), 67(10) [107, 108, and 109.], against any lifer of like sentencing standards to me [74.], [207.], and [194.], which means that such date/period is not the court imposed sentence, is therefore an illegal thing, against said lifers, as defined by competent operation of [1.], because, [1.] prohibits the creation of any thing, which by its existing operation is a criminal jurisdiction creation, but not created within any criminal jurisdiction [see text at 1403, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1406, ibid.]
1535. sentence, is therefore an illegal thing, against said lifers, as defined by competent operation of [1.], because, [1.] prohibits the creation of any thing, which by its existing operation is a criminal jurisdiction creation, but not created within any criminal jurisdiction [see text at 1403, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1406, ibid.]
1536. COMPETENT OPERATION OF [1.], because, [1.] prohibits the creation of any thing, which by its existing operation is a criminal jurisdiction creation, but not created within any criminal jurisdiction [see text at 1403, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1406, ibid.]
1537. The Parent Law of Australia exists as [1.] [see text at 1530, ibid.]
1538. [1.] enables (as described in [3.], jurisdiction held to sentence me [74.], below)
1539. CHAPTER I (jurisdiction to create, impose, enforce sentence, not exist)
1540. CHAPTER II (jurisdiction of SA Gov. within [85.] is administrative, enforce)
1541. CHAPTER III (jurisdiction of sentencing court is criminal, impose only)
1533. Watson [194.], is that all matters borne from operation/application of DCS Act [85.], are restricted to administrative law only, and cannot jurisdictionally operate any criminal law investigations/outcomes, as Administrative Law is the competent limit (per Ch. II [3.]), whilst
1534. enforcing an imposed sentence upon a lifer (so that any creation, imposition, enforcement of any thing, which in its operation equates to a NRP date/NRP of time, as effected by operation of DCS Act ss. 67(9), 67(9)(B), 67(9)(C), 67(10) [107, 108, and 109.], against any lifer of like sentencing standards to me [74.], [207.], and [194.], which means that such date/period is not the court imposed sentence, is therefore an illegal thing, against said lifers, as defined by competent operation of [1.], because, [1.] prohibits the creation of any thing, which by its existing operation is a criminal jurisdiction creation, but not created within any criminal jurisdiction [see text at 1403, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1406, ibid.]
1535. sentence, is therefore an illegal thing, against said lifers, as defined by competent operation of [1.], because, [1.] prohibits the creation of any thing, which by its existing operation is a criminal jurisdiction creation, but not created within any criminal jurisdiction [see text at 1403, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1406, ibid.]
1536. COMPETENT OPERATION OF [1.], because, [1.] prohibits the creation of any thing, which by its existing operation is a criminal jurisdiction creation, but not created within any criminal jurisdiction [see text at 1403, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1406, ibid.]
1537. The Parent Law of Australia exists as [1.] [see text at 1530, ibid.]
1538. [1.] enables (as described in [3.], jurisdiction held to sentence me [74.], below)
1539. CHAPTER I (jurisdiction to create, impose, enforce sentence, not exist)
1540. CHAPTER II (jurisdiction of SA Gov. within [85.] is administrative, enforce)
1541. CHAPTER III (jurisdiction of sentencing court is criminal, impose only)

1542. AS INDICATED ABOVE (AND THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT), THE PCS ACT [85.], EXISTS AND FUNCTIONS AND OPERATES ONLY WITHIN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JURISDICTION [SEE TEXT AT 1533, 1540. IBID.], AND IS A STATUTORY CONSTRUCT OF AND WITHIN CH. II [3.] ([14.] AND [33. "STATE INSTRUMENTALITY"]), FOR USE BY SA GOVERNMENT TO ENFORCE AGAINST A LIFER (PRISONER), THE SENTENCE 'ORDER' IMPOSED BY COMPETENT COURT
1543. [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847. IBID.]. SAID 'ORDER' CAN ONLY BE CREATED IN AND BY THE COMPETENT APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION, WHICH DOES NOT EXIST IN CH. I [3.], OR CH. II [3.] ([SEE TEXT AT 1539, 1540. IBID.]), AS [1.] ONLY ~~THE~~ AUTHORISES/PERMITS COMPETENT JURISDICTION FOR THE HEARING, CONSIDERING AND DETERMINING OF MATTERS, FORM OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, RELATING TO A ~~THE~~ 'LIFER' (A LIFER CAN ONLY HAVE SUCH LABEL UPON SENTENCE FOR 'CAPITAL CRIME', HENCE THE COMMON INDICATOR OF 'LIFER'), IN CH. III [3.], AS THE COURTS OF AUSTRALIAN LAW ONLY EXIST IN CH. III [3.], SO THAT A SENTENCE 'ORDER' CAN ONLY BE BORNE
1544. FROM COMPETENT COURT IN CH. III [3.] ALSO. THE 'ORDER' CAN THEREFORE ALSO ONLY BE INCREASED (AS TO PENALTY OF COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE ORDER), BY A HEARING, CONSIDERING AND RE-DETERMINING IN A CH. III [3.] COURT (OF
1545. COMPETENT JURISDICTION). AN EXAMPLE TEXT ILLUSTRATING THE CONTINUATION OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, ALSO RELEVANT FROM MY SENTENCE PERSPECTIVE ([74.]), FROM
1546. ~~THE~~ [210.] JUDGMENT PROPER, AT PARAGRAPH 61. THEREIN, "IT IS NECESSARY... TO IDENTIFY THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT, ... IT WAS CLEARLY NOT THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION CONFERRED BY THE CLC ACT. THE APPLICATION WAS HEADED "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA CRIMINAL JURISDICTION". IT WAS BROUGHT IN THE ORIGINAL
1547. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. ... ONLY RELEVANT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WAS THAT [WHICH THE DPP] HAD INVOKED WHEN FILING THE INFORMATION CHARGING THE APPELLANTS WHICH LED TO THEIR TRIAL AND THE VERDICTS AND ORDERS WHICH FOLLOWED.
- ASSUMING, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, THAT THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT EXHAUSTED WHEN THE VERDICTS AND SENTENCES WERE FORMALLY RECORDED, THE REFERRAL OF QUESTIONS TO THE FULL
1548. COURT ON THE FIRST APPLICATION DID NOT CHANGE ITS NATURE. AS APPEARS BELOW, THE "INHERENT JURISDICTION" RELIED UPON BY THE DPP AND THE FULL COURT TO AUTHORISE THE ORDERS MADE ON THE APPLICATION IS NOT AN ADDITIONAL HEAD OF JURISDICTION.

1549. IT IS A COLLECTION OF POWERS IN AID OF JURISDICTION.⁹⁹ FROM THAT PARTICULAR PORTION OF TEXT, AT SAID PARAGRAPH 61, APPROACH RELEVANCE FROM THE DELETION OF THE SPECIFIC CASE PARTICULARS, THEN VIEW THE FOUNDATION ISSUE, WHICH IS AT A FUNDAMENTAL POINT, BEING 'JURISDICTION', WHO HAS IT, WHEN, WHY, FOR WHAT SPECIFIC PURPOSE, AND, OF CRITICAL AND INTRINSIC IMPORTANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE TO THE 'OUTCOME ACHIEVED', IS, 'DID THE CREATOR OF OUTCOME DETERMINED/DECIDED, HOLD THE REQUISITE JURISDICTION?' [65., 82. AND 83.].

1550. IT IS TO THE BENEFIT OF JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION THAT THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, IN THE JOINT MATTER OF [210.], HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO PUBLICLY INVESTIGATE THE EVENTS/ACTIONS WHICH GAVE RISE TO SAID JUDGMENT ([210.]), WHEREIN, AS CHARACTERISED AT PARAGRAPHS 100, 101, AND 102, THE COURT CLEARLY DESCRIBED THE PRE-REQUISITE CONDITION WITHIN WHICH IT CONSIDERED 'SUBJECT MATTER OF THE HEARING', AT PARAGRAPH 101, "ONLY IF THAT PREMISE WERE ESTABLISHED WOULD THE QUESTION OF POWER TO SET ASIDE THOSE PERFECTED JUDGMENTS, BASED ON THOSE VERDICTS, ARISE."

1551. THEN, AT PARAGRAPH 102. "... THE PREMISE WAS NOT AND COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED, THE VERDICTS COULD NOT BE IMPUGNED."

1552. WITHIN [210.], THE HCA QUALIFIED THAT 'THE DPP', AND INDEPENDENTLY, 'THE FULL COURT' ([210. (JUDGMENT PROPER, PARAGRAPH 67. "... CONTRARY TO THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DPP, AND THE FINDINGS OF THE MAJORITY OF THE FULL COURT ^{81.}, INHERENT JURISDICTION IS NOT A "SEPARATE HEAD OF JURISDICTION".)]), DID NOT HOLD THE REQUISITE JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY OR POWER, TO EFFECT RESPECTIVE DECISIONS AND ACTIONS AND OUTCOMES (OF THE DPP'S INSTIGATION, AND, OF THE FULL COURT'S CREATION), WHICH CAME TO BE HEARD, ARGUED, CONSIDERED AND JUDGED BY THE HIGH COURT, IN

1553. THAT CASE, THE HCA RULED THAT, 'IF THE DPP AND THE FULL COURT HAD DEFECTIVELY CREATED DECISIONS AND OUTCOMES (AS IN FACT THE DPP AND FULL COURT HAD), THEN, THE HCA MUST INVALIDATE SUCH INCOMPETENT DECISIONS AND OUTCOMES, AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT ~~UPON~~ UPON THE FOUR CONVICTED PERSONS, AS DESCRIBED AT PARAGRAPH 1, OF THE [210.] JUDGMENT (NON-GUILTY OF MURDER, BUT CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER).

1554. THE HCA IN THE [210.] JUDGMENT, WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE DPP AND OF THE
FULL COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, FOR DISREGARDING COMPETENT JURISDICTION AND
COMPETENT AUTHORITY/POWER, SO AS TO EFFECT THE DECISIONS OF THAT (RESPECTIVE),
 1555. FULL COURT. THANKFULLY, THE HCA HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPOSE THE
 1556. JURISDICTIONAL ERRORS OF SAID FULL COURT, AND OF THE DPP. WITHIN
THIS COMPLAINT REPORT DOCUMENT, I HAVE IDENTIFIED, HIGHLIGHTED AND DESCRIBED
NUMEROUS DECISIONS AND ACHIEVED OUTCOMES (OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT),
WHICH, AS COMPLAINED ABOUT BY ME AND WHICH SPECIFICALLY RELATE TO MY
 1557. CURRENT SENTENCE (PER COURT JUDGMENT IN 2002 [74.]), 'HOW SOUTH AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT IS HOLDING ME IN PRISON [SEE TEXT AT 938, 939, 940, 941,
 1558. IBID], 'WHY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY HOLDING ME IN A PRISON,
 1559. 'THEIR OPERATIONAL CHANGE TO THE ACTUAL MEANING OF THE SPOKEN WORDS OF
 1560. MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], 'ILLEGAL DECISIONS BY SA GOVERNMENT RELATING TO
 1561. STATE ENFORCEMENT OF MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], 'THE FACT THAT DUE TO
RECENT CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, S.A. AMENDMENTS, 'PARC' PROCESS, I
 1562. CANNOT LAWFULLY APPLY FOR PAROLE', ALL RELATE TO INCOMPETENT
ACTIONS BY THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (BY ITS PARLIAMENT
(CH. I [3.]), BY ITS STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), AND VIOLATE THE
FOUNDATION AUTHORITY WITHIN WHICH THEY MUST COMPETENTLY EXIST (THE PARENT
LAW OF AUSTRALIA [1.]), [SEE TEXT AT 1520, 1536, 1537, 1538, 1539, 1540, 1541,
IBID].
1563. THE HCA CONSIDERED IN [210.], THAT ANY JUDGMENT BORNE FROM FALSE
JURISDICTION MUST BE INVALID, FOR ITS GENESIS IS NOT LEGITIMATE, AND THEREFORE IS
 1564. ALSO NOT LAWFULLY CREATED. I TOO, HAVE COME TO THE SAME EVALUATED
OUTCOME, REGARDING THE NUMEROUS DECISIONS OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT, AND PARLIAMENT, AS INDICATED BY ME WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, IN RELATION
TO MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.] ENFORCEMENT (BY SA. GOVERNMENT), AND SA
PARLIAMENT'S AMENDMENTS TO RELEVANT STATE ACTS CONCERNING INCARCERATION OF
LIFERS (AND THEIR SENTENCE ENFORCEMENT, PAROLE APPLICATIONS AND SENTENCING
RIGHTS), SINCE (AND INCLUDING BILL PROPOSAL [51.]), THE OPERATION START OF

[46.] ON 1-8-1994.

1565. A DETERMINATION / DECISION / RULING, ETC. WHICH IS CREATED BY FALSE / FRAUDULENT AUTHORITY, WITHIN FALSE AND 'NON-EXISTING ENVIRONMENT' (PURPORTED COMPETENT JURISDICTION WHICH HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL (C1.) CREDIBILITY OR VALIDITY WITHIN WHICH IT OPERATES), CANNOT HOLD CONSTITUTIONAL (C1.) JURISDICTION OR COMPETENCE, AND MUST BE VOIDED FROM ITS INTENDING / ACTUAL
1566. OPERATION. THE HCA MADE THAT POINT IN THE [210.] JUDGMENT, CONSEQUENTIAL TO 'UNAUTHORISED JUDGMENT OF THE FULL COURT' (WHICH THEN WAS CHALLENGED IN THE HIGH COURT AND THE RULING [210.] WAS DELIVERED), WHEREIN, DUE TO THE IDENTIFICATION (BY THE COURT), OF 'WHO AND WHAT HELD JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY', 'AT THE TRIAL COURT, TRIAL SENTENCING, AND ALL PROCEDURAL ACTIONS LEADING TO THAT HIGH COURT APPEAL', THE HIGH COURT'S CLARIFICATION OF SAME, LEFT NO ROOM OR OPPORTUNITY FOR MISINTERPRETATION OF THEIR INTENDED ~~MEANING~~ MEANING
1567. OF THEIR SPOKEN WORDS (IN THEIR OFFICIAL RULING). A SIMILAR APPROACH WAS ADOPTED IN 2002 BY THE FULL COURT IN MY JUDGMENT [74.], WHEREIN THAT COURT WAS VERY CLEAR AND SPECIFIC IN THEIR SPOKEN WORDS TOO, DUE TO THE NATURE OF SAID APPEAL, BUT I THINK MORESO BECAUSE SAID COURT IN 2002 ([74.]), APPRECIATED THAT IF THEY WERE NOT VERY SPECIFIC IN THEIR WORDED INTENTIONS, THERE WOULD LIKELY BE A MISINTERPRETATION (BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), WHO WOULD ACT AS ENFORCER [SEE TEXT AT 1540. IBID], OF THE SENTENCE ORDER OF THAT COURT (CH. III [3.]), WHERE THE COURT WOULD ACT ONLY AS IMPOSER [SEE TEXT AT 1541. IBID], OF THE SENTENCE ORDER), WHICH WOULD THEN TAINT THEIR OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT COMPETENCE (IF THE 'SENTENCE PURPORTEDLY BEING LAWFULLY ENFORCED', IS IN FACT NOT THE SENTENCE ORDER OF THE IMPOSING COURT'), AS THE STATE GOVERNMENT (DUE TO ITS ^{SERIOUS} ~~FAILURE~~ FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STRICT ~~ORDERS~~ ORDERS OF THE COURT [74.]), DID ACTUALLY DO ANYWAY, EVEN
1568. WITH THE INTENTIONALLY SPECIFIC WORDING WITHIN SAID JUDGMENT [74.]. I DON'T CONSIDER THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERPRETATION, OF THE OPERATIONAL MEANING, OF THE WORDS OF MY SAID 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], ARE ANYTHING OTHER THAN ILLEGAL, DELIBERATE, AND FRAUDULENT (SEE TEXT AT 1565. IBID)], AS AT NO TIME DID OR DOES ANY

- SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ENTITY/AGENCY (CH. II [3.]), OWN REQUISITE JURISDICTION TO EVEN CREATE/DELIVER ANY OFFICIAL 'MEANING/INTERPRETATION, OF THE ENFORCEABLE MEANING OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT, WHICH IS MY COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE' [74.], AS ONLY A COMPETENT COURT HOLDS SUCH REQUISITE JURISDICTION, EXCEPT ~~THAT~~ THOUGH, THE SA GOVERNMENT DID CREATE THEN DELIVER UNTO ME, 'THEIR OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT OF ENFORCEMENT' (OF SENTENCE), WHICH THEY CLAIM TO ~~W~~ LAWFULLY HOLD (AN INTERPRETATION WHICH THE SA GOVERNMENT CREATED AND STARTED ENFORCING FROM WITHIN A 'NON-EXISTING JURISDICTIONAL ENVIRONMENT', BY ACTIONS ULTRA VIRES, WITHIN CH. II [3.]). EVEN AFTER I ACTIVELY COMPLAINED TO SA GOVERNMENT PERSONS, INCLUDING PAROLE BOARD AND MINISTER OF PORTFOLIO FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, RATHER THAN SEEK OFFICIAL CLARIFICATION OF 'NPP/SENTENCE INTERPRETATION' [74.], FROM A COMPETENT COURT (WHICH THE SA GOVERNMENT IS STILL OBLIGATED TO DO), WHICH ONLY EXISTS IN CH. III [3.], THE SA GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO ILLEGALLY RESTRAIN ITS OFFICIAL REPLIES TO MY REPEATED COMPLAINTS (RE 'THEIR OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT OF ENFORCEMENT'), TO ITS OWN CH. II [3.],
1569. JURISDICTIONAL ENVIRONMENT, WHICH THEREBY ENSURED THAT 'NO COMPETENT COURT RULING, RE COURT'S CLARIFICATION OF STRICT WORDED MEANING/INTERPRETATION AND ASSOCIATED STATE GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS (CONSEQUENTIAL TO SUCH COURT CLARIFICATION AND DESCRIBED OBLIGATIONS), WOULD BE REQUESTED OR EVEN INSTIGATED BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, IN AN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE MY REPEATED COMPLAINTS ABOUT SA GOVERNMENT'S SELF-CREATED INTERPRETATION, OF WHAT 'IT' CONSIDERS ITS SENTENCE ENFORCEMENT OBLIGATIONS
1571. TO BE'. IT IS AN INTERESTING POINT ALSO, THAT, DUE TO THE WORDING OF [74.], ESPECIALLY AT [77., 80. AND 78.], THERE EXISTS AN ABSOLUTE DIRECTION/ORDER OF THE COMPETENT COURT, THAT REMOVES ALL POSSIBLE AMBIGUITY THAT MAY HAVE OTHERWISE
1572. EXISTED (AS IF THE COURT MADE EXTRA EFFORT TO ENSURE ITS WORDS WERE CLEAR, DELIBERATE, INTENTIONALLY FORTIFYING, AND NOT ABLE TO BE LEGITIMATELY
1573. MISUNDERSTOOD/~~WAS~~ MISINTERPRETED), HOWEVER, IF THE SA GOVERNMENT (THROUGH OFFICIAL REQUEST TO THE COMPETENT COURT, FROM THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S OFFICE

OR THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS), WAS IN ANY WAY CONFUSED BY THE WORDING OF THE COURT'S JUDGMENT [74.], OR WASN'T SURE IF IT COULD COMPLIANTLY ENFORCE THE TRUE ORDERS AND SENTENCING INTENTIONS (OF THE COURT), WHILE ENGAGED IN THEIR ENFORCEMENT [SEE TEXT AT 1540. IBID], OF SAID COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE ([74.]), AS PER OBLIGATION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT UPON MY IMPOSED SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION AS A LIFER [SEE TEXT AT 1541, 846, 847. IBID], THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY OBLIGATED ([1.]), TO KNOW AND UNDERSTAND THE SENTENCE WHICH, PER ITS JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY (CH. II [3.]),

1574. IT WAS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH AND ENFORCE, AND THEREFORE, IF ANY WORDING IN JUDGMENT [74.], IMPLIED, SUGGESTED OR 'DIRECTED' ANY PARTICULAR FEATURE OF IMPOSED SENTENCE (WHICH DID IN FACT EXIST, [77., 80. AND 78.]), WHICH WAS 'DIFFERENT TO EXISTING SENTENCING STANDARDS', AND MIGHT GIVE RISE TO CONFUSION OF 'INTENDED OPERATIONAL MEANING', THE SA GOVERNMENT HAD NO DISCRETION OPEN TO IT AS 'ENFORCER OF SENTENCE' [SEE TEXT AT 1540, 846, 847. IBID], TO MAKE ANY DECISION AS TO THE 'COURT'S INTENDED MEANING' OF SAID SENTENCE [74.] WORDING, SO IT WAS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN PROPER AND COMPETENT COURT'S

1575. CLARIFICATION (COURTS OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION, RE SUBJECT MATTER, ONLY EXIST IN CH. III [3.], AND, AS SENTENCE [74.] WAS AN ORDER OF THE FULL COURT, AT LEAST CO-ORDINATE JUDICIAL ENVIRONMENT [SEE TEXT AT 1568 "REQUISITE JURISDICTION", IBID], MUST BE APPLIED TO FOR SUCH A 'CLARIFICATION'), SO THAT ANY POSSIBLE 'CONFUSION' (BY THE SA GOVERNMENT), IS PROMPTLY VACATED FROM THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SENTENCE ENFORCEMENT OBLIGATIONS [SEE TEXT

1576. AT 1541, 1540, 846, 847. IBID]. WHAT THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SHOWS, IS THAT THE SA GOVERNMENT DID NOT (SINCE DELIVERY BY THE COURT [74.], IN 2002), SEEK TO OBTAIN FROM ANY CH. III [3.], COURT, AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO AUGUST 2017, ANY COURT'S CLARIFICATION OF COURT'S INTENDED OPERATIONAL MEANING, OF THE WORDS OF MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], NOT EVEN ~~AND~~ AFTER MY NUMEROUS WRITTEN COMPLAINTS

1577. TO GOVERNMENT PERSONS/DEPARTMENTS, INSTEAD, THE SA GOVERNMENT, UNLAWFULLY GAVE ITSELF A 'FAKE - JURISDICTION' (WITHIN CH. II [3.]), IN OTHER WORDS, IT

1578. EMPOWERED ITSELF (SA GOVERNMENT, CH. II [3.]), WITH 'AUTHORITY' (ALTHOUGH NOT

ACTUALLY DONE WITH ANY DEGREE OF CONSTITUTIONAL (1.1), COMPETENCE, AS SUCH

COMPETENCE IS ONLY ACTIONABLE BY THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT ([3.1], CH. I.), AND

STRICT WORDING OF THE CONSTITUTION [1.1], THOUGH EVEN [1.1] WOULD NOT BE

ABLE TO WORD WHAT SA GOVERNMENT AUTHORITATIVELY CLAIMED POWER TO GRANT

ITSELF WITH, DUE TO SEPARATION OF POWERS [3.4, 5, 7, AND 12.1], TO MAKE A

'DECISION' WHICH CAN IN FACT ONLY BE DONE VIA AND BY A COMPETENT COURT (WHICH

ONLY EXISTS IN CH. III [3.1], AS A COURT IS THE ONLY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (WHICH

RELATES TO SENTENCING OF A LIFER ([194. (PARA. II.1)]), CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.1]

PERMITTED TO INVESTIGATE, CONSIDER AND DELIVER UPON A SENTENCED LIFER, THE MEANING

AND VALID INTERPRETATION OF THE LIFER'S COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE [3.7.1],

WHEREBY,

1579. THE 'DECISION' MADE INCORPORATES, THE DECISION NOT TO SEEK 'SENTENCE

INTERPRETATION CLARIFICATION' FROM THE FULL COURT (FURTHER EXPLAINING THE

ENFORCEMENT OBLIGATIONS OF THE SA GOVERNMENT [see TEXT AT 846, 847, 847.1],

1580. THE DECISION TO DISREGARD THE NON-STANDARD ORDERS OF THE FULL COURT [7.7,

78., 80. AND 45.1], AND IMPOSE SA GOVERNMENT'S OWN SENTENCE (EFFECTIVELY),

1581. THE DECISION TO RECALCULATE OUT OF OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATION, THE PROPER

1992 SENTENCE CALCULATION FORMULA, [see TEXT AT 938, 939, 940, 941. 1582.]

1582. THE DECISION TO DENY ME THE ACCRUED (SUBSTANTIVE) RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH

NPP CALCULATION (1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS), AND 'NPP START', 'END' AND

'FINALISATION/CONCLUSION OF' PURSUANT TO 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS [207,

(PARA. 202)], WHICH INCLUDES STATUTORY RIGHT THAT AT COMPLETION OF PAROLE PERIOD,

ITSELF HAVING A PERMITTED MAXIMUM DURATION OF TEN YEARS, RESPECTIVE SENTENCE

"WILL BE WHOLLY SATISFIED" [see TEXT AT 938 TO 941 INCLUSIVE, 1582.], THEREFORE

LEAVING AN OBVIOUS QUESTION THAT IF I AM NOT SERVING MY COURT IMPOSED

SENTENCE... WHOSE SENTENCE AM I SERVING?

1583. THE DECISION TO 'REPEATEDLY FALL-BACK TO THE SA GOVERNMENT'S EXCUSE,

THAT, THEY HAVE OBTAINED CROWN SOLICITOR ADVICE ABOUT CORRECT OBSERVANCE

AND APPLICATION, OF RELEVANT FACTORS TOWARDS ENFORCEMENT OF MY 2002

SENTENCING, THAT THEY ARE CORRECT AND THAT I AM WRONG AND THAT I